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PRESERVING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FAMILY
UNITY: CHAMPIONING NOTIONS OF SOCIAL CONTRACT
AND COMMUNITY TIES IN THE BATTLE OF PLENARY
POWER VERSUS ALIENS' RIGHTS
LINDA KELLY*
But the fact of the matter is the Constitution of the United States
obligates-it doesn't ask-it obligates the President and Congress
to defend the states of the American union from foreign invasion.
And when you have one, two, three million people walking across
your border a year, breaking your laws, you have an invasion. I
Our progress in degeneracy appears to me pretty rapid. As a na-
tion, we began by declaring that "all men are created equal." We
now practically read it "all men are created equal, except negroes."
When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read "all men are
created equal, except negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics."
When it comes to this I should prefer emigrating to some country
where they make no pretence of loving liberty-to Russia, for in-
stance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base
alloy of hypocrisy. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
IMMIGRATION law, always the unwanted child of constitutional
.jurisprudence, has survived renewed efforts to further her es-
trangement. In the summer of 1995, Representative Lamar Smith
(R-TX), the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigra-
* Assistant Professor, Saint Thomas University School of Law; B.A., University
of Virginia; J.D., University of Virginia. I benefitted greatly from the 1996 Immi-
gration Law Conference in Boulder, Colorado and the valuable insights of Gilbert
Carrasco, Fernando Chang-Muy, Maryellen Fullerton, Kevin Johnson, Daniel Kan-
stroom, Gerald Neuman, Michael Scaperlanda and Margaret Taylor. Special
thanks to the participants of the St. Thomas Faculty Forum and the thoughtful
comments of Peter Bayer, Dan Gordon, Beverly Horsburgh, Lenora Ledwon, Rich-
ard Maloy, Peter Margulies,Jennifer O'Hare, Ediberto Roman and Siegfried Wiess-
ner. Thanks also to Daniel C. Thomas for his technologically progressive research
assistance.
1. Pat Buchanan, Statement at Arizona Republican Presidential Debate, Feb. 23,
1996, available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Elct 96 File.
2. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Joshua Speed (Aug. 24, 1855), reprinted in
2 THE COLLECTED WORK OF AnRAHAM LINCOLN 320, 323 (R. Basler ed., 1953).
(725)
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lion, introduced House Bill 2202. 3 The original version of the bill
proposed radical and sweeping changes in the current immigration
system. House Bill 2202 would have reduced legal immigration by
over thirty percent, reducing family sponsored visas from 480,000 to
330,000.4 This reduction would have restricted certain family cate-
gories while eliminating other categories.5 The proposed bill
would have placed greater restrictions on the rights of lawful per-
manent residents to be with their spouses or children, placed re-
strictions on the rights of United States citizens to be with their
parents where no restrictions currently exist, eliminated the rights
of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents to be with
their adult children and eliminated the right of United States citi-
zens to be with their brothers or sisters.6
Despite the fact that the provisions restricting legal immigra-
tion were stripped from House Bill 22027 and efforts in the Senate
to limit legal immigration were rejected,8 the current wave of anti-
immigrant sentiment did not subside. On April 24, 1996, in signing
3. H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (1995).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) §§ 201-204, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1151-1154 (1994). See also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PRO-
CESS AND POLICY 125-28, 150-92 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing cases and problems in-
volving admission and exclusion of immigrants); IRAJ. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW
SOURCEBOOK 448-86 (5th ed. 1995) (outlining issues raised by family based immi-
gration); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 129-80 (1992) (dis-
cussing problems arising in INA with regard to quotas).
5. H.R. 2202.
6. See House Committee Approves Major Reform Bill, Floor Action Next, 72 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 1503 (1995) (discussing House amendments and future of bill);
House Judiciary Committee Continues Work on Major Reform Bill, 72 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 1371 (1995) (discussing mark-up of House bill); House Judiciary Committee
Begins Considering Major Reform Bill, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1303 (1996) (same);
Stephen A. Holmes, Congress Plans Stiff New Curb on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1995, at Al (noting Congress's plans to limit immigration); Lamar Smith, Immi-
gration Reform Urgency, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at A16 (stating "[n]ow is the
time to pass comprehensive immigration reform"); Immigration Legislation 1995:
Information and Analysis (American Immigration Lawyer's Assoc.) (undated mate-
rial) (discussing H.R. 2202's effect on families).
7. The version of House Bill 2202 which the House passed on March 21, 1996
by a 333-87 vote mostly focuses on efforts to limit illegal immigration. House Ap-
proves Immigration Bill After Removing Legal Immigration Restrictions, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 349 (1996); Carolyn Skorneck, House Passes Immigration Bill, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 22, 1996, at 3.
8. By a vote of 20-80, the Senate rejected Senator Simpson's amendment to
Senate Bill 1664 which would have set an annual cap of 480,000 on family based
immigration. Senate Approves Omnibus Immigration Bill After Removing Exclusion Provi-
sions, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 601, 602 (1996). While no current family prefer-
ence categories would have been eliminated, the practical effect of such a cap
would have been to make visas unavailable in certain preference categories. Id.;
Immigration: Senate Judiciary Approves Immigration Reform Legislation, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), Mar. 22, 1996, at 56, D4; Senate Committee Splits Immigration Reform Bill,
2
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the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),9 President Bill Clinton acknowledged that the bill
"makes a number of major, ill-advised changes to our immigration
laws having nothing to do with fighting terrorism." 10 Yet as the
1996 presidential election drew closer, two other pieces of legisla-
tion further curtailing immigrant rights were enacted-the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRAIRA) nI and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
House Floor Action Is Next, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 313, 315-16 (1996); Senate Rejects
Amendment to Cut Legal Immigration, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 570 (1996).
9. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
10. See President Signs Terrorism Bill into Law, Congress Passes Correction Measures,
73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 568 (1996) [hereinafter President Signs Terrorism Bill].
One of the most troubling provisions of the anti-terrorism legislation was § 414
which subjects any individual who has entered the United States without inspec-
tion ("EWI") to exclusion, rather than deportation proceedings, no matter how
long such individual has been in the United States. AEDPA § 414(a). While Ille-
gal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 308(d) (2) (D), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.), repealed AEDPA § 414, IIRAIRA § 301 declares aliens who ar-
rived in the United States without inspection to be inadmissable and subject to
removal. IIRAIRA § 301 (to be codified at INA § 212 (a)(6)(A), 8 U.S.C.).
AEDPA § 422 also created "expedited exclusion" proceedings for individuals
who at the point of entry do not have the appropriate entry documents. President
Signs Terrorism Bill, supra at 569. Again consistent with AEDPA's intent, while
IIRAIRA § 308(d) (5) repealed AEDPA § 422, IIRAIRA § 302 allows for the "expe-
dited removal" of most aliens who are determined to be inadmissable at the port of
arrival. IIRAIRA § 302 (to be codified at INA § 235, 8 U.S.C.). Such summary
processing may also apply to aliens who have not been legally admitted or paroled
and cannot affirmatively show that they have been continuously, physically present
in the United States for more than two years. Id.
These types of changes point out some of the semantics changed through
IIRAIRA. Individuals previously considered "excludable" pursuant to INA § 212
are now considered "inadmissable" and subject to "cancellation of removal pro-
ceedings" rather than "exclusion proceedings." IIRAIRA §§ 301(b), 304 (to be
codified at INA §§ 212(a) (9), 240A, in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). For a fur-
ther discussion of IIRAIRA, see infra note 11 and accompanying text.
As this Article relies on theories published prior to the passage of this signifi-
cant legislation, in order to "bridge the gap" between the old and new terms, I will
use such old terms as "excludable" somewhat interchangeably with its new term
"inadmissable" and "entry without inspection" somewhat interchangeably with its
new term "arrival without inspection."
11. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.). On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed the
IIRAIRA. Among the most severe measures is a provision replacing suspension of
deportation under INA § 244(a) and INA § 212(c) relief with "cancellation of re-
moval," a new form of relief which bears a higher burden of proof. IIRAIRA § 304
(to be codified at INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C.). For example, cancellation of removal
creates a higher standard than required for the most typical suspension of deporta-
tion claims which were advanced pursuant to INA § 244(a) (1) as (a) cancellation
of removal requires ten years of continuous physical presence; (b) a showing of
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to a United States citizen or lawful
permanent resident spouse, parent or child; and (c) a showing of good moral
character for ten years. IIRAIRA § 304 (to be codified at INA § 240A(b) (1), 8
3
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nity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("Welfare Act"). 12 Supporters of se-
vere immigration restrictions, such as those contained in the
AEDPA, the IIRAIRA and the Welfare Act, will be sure to return to
their efforts to limit legal immigration through family unification.13
U.S.C.); see also IIRAIRA § 308(a)(7) (repealing INA § 244). By contrast, suspen-
sion of deportation had required only (a) seven years good moral character;
(b) seven years continuous physical presence; and (c) a showing of extreme hard-
ship to the qualifying family member or to the alien himself. INA § 244(a) (1), 8
U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). While suspension of deportation has only been available to
those who are deportable, cancellation of removal is, however, stated to be avail-
able both to those who are inadmissable or deportable. IIRAIRA § 304, (to be
codified as INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C.).
With the enactment of IIRAIRA § 304(b), relief under INA § 212(c) has also
been repealed and replaced with "cancellation of removal." IIRAIRA § 304 (to be
codified at INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C.). This relief is more restrictive than INA
§ 212(c) as it is not available to anyone convicted of any aggravated felony, and it
requires that five of the seven years of continuous residence be spent as a lawful
permanent resident. As this form of cancellation of removal is available, however,
to lawful permanent residents who are either inadmissable or deportable, this
change appears to solve the disparity revealed by Matter of Hernandez-Casillas. 20
Int. Dec. 262 (BIA 1990, A.G. 1991), affid, Hernandez-Casillas v. INS, 983 F.2d 31
(5th Cir. 1993) (stating INA § 212(c) relief only available in deportation proceed-
ings when there is comparable ground of exclusion).
Another troubling measure of IIRAIRA creates a 10 year ban on admission to
certain individuals unlawfully present for one year or more and a three year bar on
admission to certain individuals unlawfully present for more than 180 days.
IIRAIRA § 301 (to be codified at INA § 212(a) (9) (B), 8 U.S.C.). No similar bars
have previously existed within the INA. There has been much discussion sur-
rounding the passage of IIRAIRA. See Bill to Block Illegal Immigration Passed, Signed:
Controversial Education Measure Cut, FACrS ON FILE, Oct. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News File (discussing passage of new legislation); William Branigin, Congress Fin-
ishes Major Legislation; Immigration; Focus Is Borders, Not Benefits, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
1996, at Al (same); House OKs Bills Targeting Illegal Immigrants, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Sept. 26, 1996, at 6 (same); Eric Pianin & Helen Dewar, Immigration, Budget Agree-
ment Reached, WAsH. POST, Sept. 29, 1996, at Al (same); Eric Schmitt, Bill Tries to
Balance Concerns on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1996, § 1, at 28 (same); Text
on President Clinton's Statement on Omnibus Appropriations and Immigration Reform Bill,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, News File (same).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). On August 22, 1996, the Wel-
fare Act was signed into law. Amongst other provisions, the Welfare Act severely
curtails the public benefits which have been available to lawful permanent resi-
dents. Such public benefits include not only the traditional welfare programs, but
also restrictions on access to professional and commercial licenses and the earned
income tax credit. Charles Wheeler, The New Alien Restrictions on Public Benefits:
The Full Impact Remains Uncertain, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1245 (1996) (discussing
welfare provisions); see also Deborah Billings, Welfare Reform: Clinton Signs Welfare
Reform Measure; Says It Creates Second Chance System, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Aug. 23,
1996, 164, at DlI (discussing welfare benefits); Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill
Cutting Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al (same);John F. Harris &John E.
Yang, Clinton to Sign Bill Overhauling Welfare, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al
(same).
13. Some limitation was made on family unification through IIRAIRA. Begin-
ning in the fiscal year 1999, the number of family-sponsored immigrant visas sub-
jected to numerical limitation will include a reduction for certain parolees.
IIRAIRA § 603 (amending INA § 201(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)). Another IIRAIRA
4
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These attempts to curtail family unity reveal troubling ques-
tions about America's true commitment to the family, even within
its existing immigration law. Historically, the federal government
has claimed to base U.S. immigration policy upon a commitment to
family unification. 14 Society's emphasis upon family makes family
values such an important ideal that public figures across the polit-
ical spectrum fight to identify themselves with this notion. 15 Forget
the economy. "It's values, stupid."1 6
The United States Supreme Court also recognizes the impor-
tance of family. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,17 the Supreme
Court determined that an extended family's desire to live together
involved a fundamental liberty interest protected under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 The Moore Court's
provision demands that the affidavit of support provided by an individual sponsor-
ing an alien's request for residency be executed as a contract, be legally enforce-
able against the sponsor and that such sponsor demonstrates an annual income
125% above the federal poverty lines. IIRAIRA § 551 (to be codified at INA
§ 213A, 8 U.S.C.).
14. See generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 40-63 (giving brief history of
immigration to United States);John Guendelsberger, The Right to Family Unification
in French and United States Immigration Law, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 7-25 (1988)
(explaining basis and history of U.S. immigration) [hereinafter Guendelsberger,
Family Unification].
15. See, e.g., Susan Baer, Pace of Congress Tests Family Values, BALTIMORE SUN,
Dec. 11, 1995, at 1A (noting recent divorce trend with new members of Congress);
Sandi Dolbee, Family Values to Dominate Presidential Election, Black Baptists Told, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 22, 1995, at A14 (stating that presidential campaign will
include struggle over meaning of "family values"); Family Values Still More Hypocrisy,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 5, 1995, at 4A (criticizing Republican Party's use of
"family values" slogan as political weapon); Marianne Means, House GOP Finds
"Family Values"Are Easier to Preach than to Practice, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 8, 1995, at
B11 (stating that politicians "love to rhapsodize about the virtues of traditional
family"); Alison Mitchell, On Issue of Family Values, Clinton Unveils an Agenda of His
Own, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1995, § 1, at 6 (noting that President Clinton will not
allow Republicans alone to define family values).
Regarding the Christian Coalition's contract, Ralph Reed, executive director,
remarked, "[i]t is a pro-family agenda, and it is supported by the vast majority of
the American people, Republican and Democrat, Christian and Jew, black and
white, Protestant and Catholic." Family Values II The Christian Coalition Signs on the
Dotted Line, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1995, at 45. Discussing the Christian Coali-
tion's contract, House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich declared: "Here
are some key values that matter the most to most Americans. We are committed to
keeping our faith with the people who helped the Contract With America." Adelle
M. Banks, Coalition's 'Contract' Focuses on Families, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 20, 1995, at
A21.
16. David Clark Scott, 'It's Values, Stupid,' Political Essayist Argues, CHRISTIAN
Sc. MONITOR, Dec. 6, 1995, at 14 (noting that most important touch tone for to-
day's voters is values).
17. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
18. Id. at 499 (invalidating zoning ordinance which defined family through
limited categories of related individuals); see also Frederick E. Dashiell, The Right to
5
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recognition of family rights is consistent with previous decisions rec-
ognizing the right of individuals related by "blood, adoption or
marriage" to live together. 19 Through a host of cases, the Court
acknowledges that a "'private realm of family life [exists] which the
state can not enter."' 2° The Constitution "protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."21 With family a foun-
dation of civilization, 22 the Court's protection of family promotes
"family needs" and "family values."2 3
Yet, when examining family-based immigration law in light of
the constitutional protection awarded family unity in Moore and
other cases, it is not clear that the right to family unity withstands
attack by U.S. immigration law. In the immigration arena, the goal
of family unity is not always awarded the "preferred position" it en-
joys in other areas of the law.24 Considering this apparent inconsis-
tency between the fundamental right of family unity and the
restrictions placed on this right within existing and proposed family
immigration policies, the question becomes whether the federal
government can constitutionally limit family unity through laws reg-
ulating immigration.
The federal political branches traditionally have enjoyed "ple-
nary power" over U.S. immigration law, thereby allowing this area
of law to develop outside of constitutional boundaries. 25 Notwith-
Family Life: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 6 BLACK L.J. 288 (1980) (addressing
reasoning and significance of Moore).
19. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding village zon-
ing ordinance as valid land use regulation).
20. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)); see, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399-400 (1978) (discussing pro-
tection of rights of family); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974) (same); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (same); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972) (same); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47
(1972) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972) (same); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (same); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7
(1967) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 485-86 (1965) (same); Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-44, 549-55 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (same); May
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (same); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. William-
son, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (same); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925) (same); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (same).
21. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 496 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
23. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.
24. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Appellant's
Brief at 26, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (No. 73-191)) (dis-
cussing preference for family unity).
25. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (hold-
ing alien's right to enter United States depends on congressional will); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (explaining that aliens
730
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standing the immigration law arena, aliens enjoy the protection of
certain rights through what is known as the aliens' rights tradi-
tion.26 Cracks, however, have developed in both the plenary power
doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition.2 7 Critics of the plenary
power doctrine versus aliens' rights distinction offer alternative the-
ories to explain the foundation of U.S. immigration policy and its
treatment of aliens. Professor David Martin focuses on member-
have vested right of entry into United States); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893) (holding right to exclude or expel all aliens within congressional
power); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889) (holding immigration act excluding Chinese laborers constitutional). See
generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-40 (explaining sources of federal im-
migration power through Chinese Exclusion Case); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immi-
gration Law and the Principle of the Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. Rv. 255
(discussing plenary power doctrine and theories on which it is based) [hereinafter
Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power]; Michael Scaperlanda, The Life and
Jurisprudence ofJustice Thurgood Marshall: Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Legacy of
Dissent in Federal Alienage Case, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 69 (1994) (recognizing majori-
ties in plenary power cases consistently conclude that political branches are totally
free to set whatever immigration rules they choose) [hereinafter Scaperlanda, Mar-
shall'sJurisprudence]. For a further discussion of the federal political branches' ple-
nary power, see infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
26. SeeYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that temporary U.S.
residents are entitled to constitutional protection); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs: Rights-Here and
There: Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 865-66
(1989) (stating that resident aliens, refugees and asylees are accorded nearly all
federal benefits) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens] ; Louis Henkin,
The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our
Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11, 14-18 (1985) (discussing extension of due pro-
cess rights and protections to resident aliens) [hereinafter Henkin, Constitution as
Compact and Conscience]. For a further discussion of the aliens' rights tradition, see
infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
27. See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)
(holding that Fourth Amendment protection against search and seizure does not
extend to nonresident aliens); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (holding
that resident alien is entitled to due process at exclusionary hearing); Linda S.
Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rj-v.
1047, 1059-65 (1994) (discussing difference in rights accorded to aliens inside and
outside of immigration law); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power:
Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 930-37 (1995)
(discussing expansion of exceptions to plenary power in lower courts) [hereinafter
Legomsky, Ten More Years]; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE
L.J. 545 (1990) (examining decline of plenary power doctrine) [hereinafter
Motomura, Phantom Norms]; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigra-
tion Law: Procedural Suogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv.
1625 (1992) (examining difference between substantive and procedural rights af-
forded aliens) [hereinafter Motomura, Procedural Surrogates]; Margaret H. Taylor,
Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Ple-
nary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1135-39 (1995) (discussing con-
flict between plenary power doctrine and aliens' rights tradition). For a further
discussion of the conflict between the plenary power doctrine and aliens' right
tradition, see infra notes 88-120 and accompanying text.
1996]
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ship in the national community:to answer questions regarding due
process. 28 Responding to Martin, Professor Alexander Aleinikoff
widens the focus to include an evaluation of community ties.29
While Martin and Aleinikoff predominantly discuss the constitu-
tional rights of aliens in the United States, Professor Gerald
Neuman advances mutuality notions in looking at the rights of
aliens "outside the United States who have never been inside the
United States."30 This Article relies on these theories in developing
a "constitutionally humane" approach toward creating policies
which affect aliens. Applying this theory to the question of family-
sponsored immigration will allow for a proper evaluation of the
rights of all individuals who may be influenced by our immigration
laws.
In Part II, this Article will address the plenary power doctrine
and its evolution. 31 Part III will discuss the history of the aliens'
rights tradition.3 2 After highlighting the difficulties in applying
these approaches through a discussion of recent cases and criti-
cisms in Part IV, the alternative theories suggested by David Martin
and Alexander Aleinikoff will be discussed in Part V.33 Cases indi-
cating the courts' attention to these doctrines will be reviewed in
Part VI.34 To remedy a flaw in the approaches of Martin and
Aleinikoff which is noted in this discussion, Gerald Neuman's the-
ory will be evaluated in Part VII.35 Part VIII will suggest how aspects
28. David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community:
Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PIr. L. REv. 165 (1983) (Professor Martin, cur-
rently on leave from academia, now serves as Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) General Counsel). For a further discussion of Professor Martin's focus
on membership in the national community, see infra notes 121-26 and accompany-
ing text.
29. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants in Ameri-
can Law: Aliens, Due Process, and "Community Ties:" A Response to Martin, 44 U. Prr-r.
L. REv. 237, 244 (1983) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Community Ties]. For a further
discussion of Professor Aleinikoff, see infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
30. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 981 (1991). For
a further discussion of Professor Neuman's mutuality approach, see infra notes
203-214 and accompanying text.
31. For a further discussion of the plenary power doctrine and its evolution,
see infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
32. For a further discussion of the history of the aliens' rights tradition, see
infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of recent cases and criticisms, see infra notes 88-
120 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the alternative theories
suggested by David Martin and Alexander Aleinikoff, see infra notes 121-33 and
accompanying text.
34. For a further discussion of cases indicating the courts' attention to these
doctrines, see infra notes 134-201 and accompanying text.
35. For a further discussion of Professor Neuman's theory, see infra notes 203-
14 and accompanying text.
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of each of these theories can combine to create a "constitutionally
humane" approach for the United States to follow in exercising its
authority over aliens.36 Finally, Part IX will apply this "constitution-
ally humane" approach to the question of family unity through im-
migration law in an attempt to illustrate how U.S. immigration law
can be fairly established. 37
II. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
The federal government's power to regulate immigration be-
gan with Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case).38
In confirming Congress's absolute authority to prevent aliens from
entering the United States, the Chinese Exclusion Case set the stage
for an area of law exempt from constitutional scrutiny and
protection.3 9
This "plenary power" the federal government enjoys in immi-
gration matters is extracted from the federal government's recog-
nized right to sovereignty-the right to possess full control over
U.S. territory and foreign affairs. 40 In the Chinese Exclusion Case, the
Supreme Court rationalized that because the United States cer-
tainly had the right to protect itself from invading armies, it natu-
rally followed that it also had the right to protect itself from "vast
hordes of [a foreign] people crowding in upon us." 41 Thus, despite
36. For a further discussion of the "constitutionally humane" approach for
the United States to follow in exercising its authority over aliens, see infra notes
240-42 and accompanying text.
37. For a further discussion of applying the "constitutionally humane" ap-
proach to the question of family unity through immigration law, see infra notes
243-85 and accompanying text.
38. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Petitioner had been a lawful permanent resident of
the United States for 12 years. Id. at 582. After leaving the United States with a
certificate to re-enter, petitioner was denied re-entry when Congress amended the
Chinese Exclusion Act declaring these certificates "void and of no effect." Id. at
599.
39. Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 862; Taylor, supra
note 27, at 1128.
40. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603-04; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONsr. COMMENTARY 9, 10-12
(1990) (discussing inherent power of Congress to expel or exclude aliens) [here-
inafter Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership]; Henkin, Constitution as Compact and
Conscience, supra note 26, at 25 (discussing holding of Chinese Exclusion Case). For a
discussion of the transformation of the notion of sovereignty, suggesting a diminu-
tion in the government's right to absolute sovereignty since the Chinese Exclusion
Case and thereby a weakening in the plenary power doctrine as a result of U.S.
adherence to customary and conventional international law, see Michael Scaper-
landa, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wisc. L. REv. 965 [hereinafter
Scaperlanda, Polishing the Golden Door].
41. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606; see also Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation
of Aliens, supra note 26, at 863 (discussing Supreme Court's analogy between invad-
19961
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the constitutional principle that the federal government be limited
to its enumerated powers, 42 the Supreme Court found Congress's
power to control immigration inherent within its sovereign right to
control U.S. territory and to protect its borders. 43 The Supreme
Court held that the "power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an inci-
dent of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United
States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution."'44
In creating the federal political branches' plenary power over
immigration from the sovereignty perspective, the Constitution and
the rights of the people essentially are ignored.45 Since the Chinese
Exclusion Case, immigration law has continued to fester, with a disre-
gard for fundamental rights and values. Four years after the Chinese
Exclusion Case, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,46 the Court ap-
proved Congress's power to deport resident aliens. 47 Thus, the
Court awarded the federal government not only the authority to
prevent people from entering, but also the full discretion to de-
mand an individual's departure. 48 According to the Court, the
right to deport foreigners, like the right to exclude them, was "an
inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent
nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare." 49
The only softening, which came early in the development of the
severe principles of the plenary power doctrine, resulted from Ya-
mataya v. Fischer (Japanese Immigrant Case).50 As a result of the Japa-
ing armies and aliens in Chinese Exclusion Case); Taylor, supra note 27, at 1128-29
(discussing Supreme Court's rationale in Chinese Exclusion Case).
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."); see also Henkin, Constitution as Compact and
Conscience, supra note 26, at 25 (noting that "[t]he power to control immigration is
not one of the enumerated powers of Congress").
43. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
44. Id.
45. Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 863.
46. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
47. Id. at 713. In Fong Yue Ting, as a result of an amendment to the Chinese
Exclusion Act, a Chinese resident could be deported if he or she had not obtained
a certificate of residence or could not show "through testimony of one credible
white witness" that he or she was a lawful U.S. resident. Id. at 727.
48. See id. at 731 (holding that question of whether aliens are permitted to
remain in United States is determined by Congress).
49. Id. at 711; see also Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at
863 (noting Supreme Court's use of dire terms in reaching its conclusion); Taylor,
supra note 27, at 1128-29 (discussing Supreme Court's extension of Congress's ple-
nary power to deport resident aliens in Fong Yue Ting).
50. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
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nese Immigration Case, procedural due process has been required in
deportation proceedings.51
While the laws challenged in the Chinese Exclusion Case and
Fong Yue Ting reflect the country's racist motivations at the turn of
the century, these types of laws, if passed today, could arguably be
upheld through the plenary power doctrine.52 Over the past 100
years, the Court has pronounced significant individual rights which
include what are currently considered basic constitutional rights of
due process and equal protection."8 This respect for individual
rights is not, however, reflected within the Court's review of immi-
gration law. The Court continues to show great deference to Con-
gress's plenary power to control immigration.54
Less than fifty years ago, the Supreme Court upheld the
United States Attorney General's power to exclude the wife of a
United States citizen without a hearing in United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy.55 Three years later, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei,56 the Court "accomplished the improbable feat of render-
51. Id. at 101; see also Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 238 (discuss-
ing sharp scrutiny Supreme Court gives procedure in deportation cases).
52. Taylor, supra note 27, at 1128-29. In Fong Yue Ting, the testimony of a
white witness was required because it was believed that a Chinese witness was more
likely to possess "loose notions" regarding the obligation of an oath. 149 U.S. at
729-30 (citing Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 598 (1889)).
53. See Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 864 (noting that
Supreme Court recognized important rights in late nineteenth century); Henkin,
Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 15 (discussing Supreme
Court's recognition of important individual rights).
54. See Taylor, supra note 27, at 1129-33 (noting that Supreme Court's recog-
nition of plenary powers doctrine continued throughout Cold War era).
55. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). The Attorney General's power to exclude Knauff,
based solely upon the Attorney General's statement that her admission "would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United States," was beyond review by the Court.
Id. at 539-40, 543. Knauff was paroled from Ellis Island only after a public outcry of
support. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from
the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 955-64 (1995).
After being afforded a hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry which found
her excludable as a threat to national security, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) reversed, holding that uncorroborated hearsay evidence without more, was
not sufficient to support an order of exclusion. See generally ELLEN KNAUFF, THE
ELLEN KNAUFF STORY (1952) (relating injustice inflicted on Ellen Knauff).
56. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). In Mezei, the husband of a U.S. citizen who had
lawfully resided in the United States for 25 years was excluded and detained with-
out a hearing after leaving the United States and returning 19 months later from
visiting his dying mother in Rumania, where he had trouble securing an exit per-
mit. Id. at 208. The Attorney General declared Mezei to be a threat to national
security and could have been "detained indefinitely, perhaps for life, for a cause
known only to the Attorney General." Id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's grant of habeas corpus, finding that, in
reviewing Mezei's due process claim, he should be "treated as if stopped at the
border." Id. at 215. The Court found his detention did not constitute an entry
1996]
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ing the Knauff outcome even more severe." 57 In an unrivaled dem-
onstration of timidity, the Court in Mezei extended the holding in
Knauff by finding that a returning lawful permanent resident's
rights were as minimal as the rights of first time entrants, like
Knauff.58 Affirming the language in Knauff the Mezei Court held
that for a returning resident, "'[w] hatever the procedure author-
ized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry
is concerned.' ' 59 More recently, the Court indicated that it has
some "limited judicial responsibility" with respect to Congress's
power to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens. 60 Yet, its
application of this principle has been criticized as "toothless."6 ' For
many commentators, the Knauff-Mezei doctrine still forms the basis
into the United States and therefore, exclusion proceedings were proper and he
was not entitled to procedural due process rights. Id. at 213-15. Moreover, his 25
years of residency in the United States did not entitle him to greater due process
protection. Id. at 213-14. This aspect of the Mezei holding was modified by Landon
v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), which held that a returning resident, while placed
in exclusion proceedings, is entitled to procedural due process protection. Lan-
don, 459 U.S. at 34. Mezei was ultimately afforded a hearing after the Supreme
Court upheld his exclusion. Weisselberg, supra note 55, at 964-84. While the
Board of Special Inquiry upheld the charges of his membership in the Communist
party, it made an off the record recommendation for his release and he was pa-
roled after four years of detention. Id. at 982.
57. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 385 (discussing Knauff decision).
58. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.
59. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950)). Courts have criticized the reasoning used in Knauff and Mezei, which sug-
gests excludable aliens may never invoke constitutional due process protections.
See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 874 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). At an ex-
treme, this would allow the Attorney General to invoke legitimate immigration
goals to stop feeding excludable aliens in detention. Id. For a discussion of cases
criticizing the use of the plenary power doctrine to allow for abysmal detention
conditions, see Taylor, supra note 27. at 1132 n.232.
One year after Mezei, in 1954 the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Despite the boldness the Court demonstrated in Brown, that
same year the Court maintained that in regards to immigration policies, "we are
not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to human rights than our
predecessors," indicating it would continue to defer to Congress. Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); see also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853, 860-
61 (1987) (noting Court's deference to Congress in Galvan is confusing in lieu of
Brown); Kikuyo Matsumoto-Power, Aliens, Resident Aliens, and U.S. Citizens in the
Never-Never Land of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 U. HAw. L. REv. 61, 77
(1993) (noting discussion by Louis Henkin regarding Chinese Exclusion Case).
60. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977) (noting acceptance of
limited judicial responsibility in regulating admission and exclusion of aliens);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (suggesting that due process
places some restrictions on congressional power).
61. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 805 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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for judicial deference to Congress's plenary power over
immigration.62
Thus, while the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
clearly states that the "due process" and "equal protection" provi-
sions apply to "all persons," the development of the Knauff-Mezei
doctrine draws distinctions among different classes of persons.63
The suggestion that excludable aliens are "nonpersons" within the
meaning of the Constitution, and thus not deserving of constitu-
tional protection was explicit in the case of Kwong Hai Chew v. Cold-
ing,6 4 decided one month before Mezei. The Court starkly framed
the issue in Kwong Hai Chew to be whether Kwong could be stripped
of "[h]is status as a person within the meaning and protection of
the Fifth Amendment. ' 65 Although finding that Kwong himself
could be recognized as a "person," the Court seemed to imply that
"genuine excludable aliens" could be treated as nonpersons who
are not entitled to the same constitutional protections provided to
"persons."66
The prior discussion suggests that the political branches have
nearly complete control over aliens.67 Not all laws affecting aliens
are, however, limited to such minimal judicial scrutiny. It is gener-
ally recognized that the plenary power doctrine governs cases chal-
62. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 402-05 (noting numerous analyses
and interpretations of Mezei doctrine); Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra
note 26, at 866 (arguing that immigration regulators should be subject to judicial
scrutiny accorded to other exercises of federal power); Henkin, Constitution as Com-
pact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 25-27 (noting that flourish of individual rights
has not shaken legacy of Chinese Exclusion Case). The "expedited removal" proce-
dures which became law through IIRAIRA § 302 perhaps signify the demand for
even greater deference to the Knauff-Mezei doctrine and the political branch's ab-
solute control over immigration. See IIRAIRA § 302, Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996)
(to be codified at INA § 235, 8 U.S.C.) (discussing expedited removal procedures).
For a further discussion of these procedures, see supra note 11.
For a further discussion of whether the plenary power belongs to Congress or
to both the Congress and the Executive, and a criticism of the plenary power doc-
trine's resurfacing in the detention cases of the 1980s, see Taylor, supra note 27, at
1140-43, 1146 n.301.
63. See Martin, supra note 28, at 176 (noting that Knauff-Mezei doctrine im-
plies excludable aliens are not persons for constitutional purposes).
64. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
65. Id. at 601.
66. Id. The Kwong decision made a limited exception to Knauff in requiring
that a lawful permanent resident, who had been gone from the United States for
four months as a crewmen, be entitled to a true hearing before the INS with full
disclosure of adverse information. Id. at 600-01. But see Martin, supra note 28, at
176 (noting that excludable aliens have the status of nonpersons). For a further
discussion of Kwong, see infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
67. For a further discussion of the political branches' control over immigra-
tion, see supra notes 38-66 and accompanying text.
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lenging immigration law, that is "the body of law governing the
admission and expulsion of aliens."68 Yet, this doctrine does not
fully reveal the courts' treatment of aliens. In other cases, aliens
have successfully asserted their individual rights. Developing con-
currently with cases governed by the plenary power doctrine was a
line of cases which would define the doctrine of the aliens' rights
tradition.
III. THE ALIENS' RIGHTS TRADITION
Prior to the Civil War, the Supreme Court had not addressed
questions regarding who was protected by the Bill of Rights and the
other limited individual rights within the body of the original Con-
stitution. 69 Yet, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, brought a significant change in focus. 70 This amendment es-
tablished the requirements of citizenship and sought to protect
those privileges from state intrusion through the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause. 71 The Fourteenth Amendment also suggested
that all persons, be they citizens or not, would enjoy the protections
provided in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 72 This
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment is consistent with the plain
language of the Fifth Amendment which also suggests that due pro-
cess should be afforded to all individuals, not just citizens. 73
68. Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 864-65. For
Aleinikoff, at the end of the nineteenth century the power over aliens was divided
into two parts: (1) cases of expulsion and admission, where Congress possessed
"plenary" power "virtually unfettered" by the Constitution (with the exception of
due process in deportation proceedings) and (2) situations where U.S. citizens
could invoke constitutional protections and where resident aliens were entitled to
the same. Id. at 864-66; see also Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenay Power, supra
note 25, at 305 (discussing future of plenary power doctrine); Motomura, Phantom
Norms, supra note 27, at 547 (defining immigration law); Taylor, supra note 27, at
1134 (noting that plenary power doctrine governs admission, exclusion and depor-
tation of aliens).
69. Henkin, Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 14-15.
70. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
71. Henkin, Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 15.
72. Id.; see also Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 81-82 (noting that lan-
guage of Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to U.S. citizens).
73. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "[nor] shall any person ... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); see also Henkin, Constitu-
tion as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 14-15 (stating that Fourteenth
Amendment established criteria for protection of individual rights).
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Shortly after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
was embraced by an alien living in the United States'to strike down
a state law denying equal protection to persons of Chinese descent
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.74 The Yick Wo Court found:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not
confined to the protection of citizens .... These provi-
sions are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences in race, or color, or of nationality; and the
equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws. 75
Yick Wo became the foundation of the aliens' rights tradition.7 6
This case led a line of cases which held that when a legal challenge
involving aliens' rights does not intrude upon the realm of immi-
gration law, courts would review the claim with the same degree of
judicial scrutiny afforded a U.S. citizen. 77 With the Fourteenth
Amendment phrase "any person" found to include aliens, shortly
after the Yick Wo decision the Supreme Court found that aliens are
included within the meaning of "person" as identified in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which safeguards a per-
son's life, liberty or property against deprivation by the federal gov-
ernment.78 Aliens also fall within the definition of "people" in the
74. 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886); see also Henkin, Constitution as Compact and
Conscience, supra note 26, at 15-16 (discussing procedural background of Yick Wo);
Taylor, supra note 27, at 1133 (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Yick Wo).
75. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
76. Henkin, Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 16.
77. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 865-66
(noting cases outside of immigration law which have afforded aliens constitutional
protections); Henkin, Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 16-18
(noting that state discrimination against aliens is subject to sharp judicial scrutiny);
Taylor, supra note 27, at 1133-35 (noting that cases have extended Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protection to aliens).
78. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that
Constitution precludes punishment of aliens for being in United States unlawfully
except pursuant to trial in accordance with Fifth and Sixth Amendments). In
Wong Wing, the Court invalidated a section of the 1892 immigration statute which
provided for "infamous punishment at hard labor" or the confiscation of property
of any Chinese national found by executive authorities to be here illegally. Id. at
237. The statute's deportation provisions had been approved in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). In Wong Wing, the Court reaffirmed these indi-
viduals could be deported, but it found the imprisonment or confiscation of prop-
erty to be punitive and that it was invalid without "a judicial trial to establish the
guilt of the accused." Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237. The Wong Wing decision her-
alded the beginning of a line of aliens' rights cases which were successfully argued
as outside the realm of immigration law and in the realm of criminal law, thus
entitling aliens to assert Fifth and Sixth Amendment protection in criminal pro-
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Fourth Amendment, and therefore, are allowed "to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." 79 Additionally, aliens are guaranteed the
protection of the First Amendment 8° and are provided the proce-
dural safeguards and immunities of other amendments."1
Yet, even within the aliens' rights tradition, the courts make a
distinction between a state's limitation on individual rights and the
ceedings. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 492 (1931)
(holding that property of alien friends may not be taken for public purposes with-
out just compensation); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that aliens are entitled to Miranda warnings during custodial interroga-
tion); United States v. Casimiro-Benitez, 533 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1976)
(holding that defendant's Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not violated dur-
ing police interrogation); see also DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 1503-05 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing
Supreme Court's classification of aliens); Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens,
supra note 26, at 864-65 (noting that "legacy of Yick Wo has... survived and flour-
ished in the 20th century"); Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1094-1101 (discussing Wong
Wing and alien rights tradition); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens
and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 742-43 (1996) [hereinafter
Scaperlanda, Partial Membership]; Taylor, supra note 27, at 134 n.240 (noting that
cases following Wong Wing tradition extend Fifth and Sixth Amendment protec-
tions to aliens in criminal proceedings). The equal protection derived from the
notion of due process as stated in the Fifth Amendment is also provided to aliens.
See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (holding Civil Service
Commission's denial of employment to resident aliens amounted to deprivation of
due process); see also Henkin, Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26,
at 16 (noting that after Yick Wo, Supreme Court considered aliens persons for pur-
poses of due process). For a further discussion of the phrase "any person," see
supra note 72-73 and accompanying text.
79. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (applying
Fourth Amendment protection against searches and seizures where alien was de-
fendant); see also Henkin, Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at
16 (noting that court decisions following Yick Wo have held aliens among "people"
entitled to Fourth Amendment protections). But see United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not apply to
seizure of nonresident alien's property in foreign country). For a further discus-
sion of aliens' Fourth Amendment rights, see infra notes 108-13 and accompanying
text.
80. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (discussing First Amend-
ment); see also Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 868 (discuss-
ing the protection of First Amendment rights in immigration context); Henkin,
Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 16 n.42 (discussing protec-
tion under Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). But see Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (protecting citizen's First Amendment right to per-
sonally communicate with alien); American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.
Meese ("ADC"), 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), vacated 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
aliens enjoyed full First Amendment rights in deportation context). For a further
discussion of Mandell see infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of ADC, see infra note 153.
81. Henkin, Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 16.
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federal government's limitation on identical rights.8 2 Historically,
the states are held to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than the
federal government, therefore entitling aliens to greater protection
against discriminatory state and local practices. 83 State discrimina-
tion against aliens creates "suspect classifications." 84 Such discrimi-
nation is sharply scrutinized and is upheld only if it serves a
"compelling state interest."85 By contrast, Congress is held to the
82. Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 864; Taylor, supra
note 27, at 1133 n.235.
83. Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 865 n.20-22; Taylor,
supra note 27, at 1133 n.235.
84. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); see also Henkin, Constitu-
tion as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 17 (noting that discriminating
against aliens creates suspect classifications which will be scrutinized).
85. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 203 (1982) (stating right of undocu-
mented children to go to public school); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (invalidating state law excluding aliens from public program). Other cases
have invalidated provisions which prevented aliens from receiving economic op-
portunities in the private sector. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227-28
(1984) (ruling state statute requiring U.S. citizenship to be notary unconstitu-
tional); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1982) (invalidating state university pol-
icy prohibiting G-4 aliens and dependents from acquiring in-state status);
Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores DeOtero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976) (holding
Puerto Rico's statute prohibiting aliens from engaging in private practice of engi-
neering deprived aliens of rights); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (deny-
ing citizenship requirement to take bar exam); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,
645-46 (1973) (ruling unconstitutional state statute requiring U.S. citizenship to be
part of state civil service).
States can, however, still use alienage classifications to deny employment and
political rights if related to the exercise of an important government function.
The Sugarman Court held that this exception was the result of a state's obligation
"to preserve the basic conception of a political community." Sugarman, 413 U.S. at
647 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)). The Court has noted
that citizenship "denotes an association with the polity," and that it creates a
"bond" of "special significance." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1.979) (up-
holding exclusion of aliens from employment as teachers). Furthermore, the
Court stated that "[tlhe exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is
not a deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the com-
munity's process of political self-definition." Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432,
439 (1982) (upholding exclusion of aliens from employment as parole officers); see
also Moreno, 458 U.S. at 12 n.17 (limiting participation of noncitizens in states'
political and governmental functions); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (up-
holding exclusion of aliens from employment as police officers). Yet, it has been
noted that "laws excluding permanent resident aliens from political participation
or government benefits are dramatically over- and under-inclusive if they are justi-
fied in terms of loyalty, competence, or identification with 'American values."'
Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, supra note 40, at 14; see also Aleinikoff, Federal
Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 865 n.21 (discussing excluding aliens from
employment as parole officers); Henkin, Constitution as Compact and Conscience,
supra note 26, at 17 (arguing discrimination is not suspect discrimination when it
substantially affects community members); Martin, supra note 28, at 196-99 (al-
lowing states to disqualify noncitizens from jobs as police officers, teachers and
deputy probation officers). For a discussion of the similarities between the states'
"political function" exception and the federal government's generally low standard
1996]
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lower standard of requiring only a "facially legitimate and bona fide
reason" for discriminating against aliens.8 6 This allows Congress to
successfully use the arguments of national sovereignty, war and
peace, and international relations to justify disparate treatment in
areas where the states are prohibited from making similar
distinctions.8 7
IV. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE VERSUS THE ALIENS' RIGHTS
TRADITION: A CRITICISM OF THE BATTLE
With the concurrent development of the plenary power doc-
trine and the aliens' rights tradition, legal challenges by aliens have
been decided after forcibly being characterized as involving "immi-
gration law" or "nonimmigration law."88 Victim to this Fong Yue
Ting versus Yick Wo phenomenon, the special equities of a case are
virtually ignored. 89 Critics of this "inside/outside" immigration law
characterization argue that it does not properly emphasize distinc-
tions between the status of aliens in cases "outside" of immigration
law and between the status of aliens in cases "inside" immigration
of scrutiny which impacts on both membership and the definition of the political
community, see Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1110-15.
86. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977) (holding it is notjudiciary's role
in cases of this sort to probe and test justifications for legislative decisions); Hamp-
ton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 99-105 (1976) (requiring legitimate basis for
preserving federal rule was that it intended to serve interest); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 81-83 (1976) (stating that those who qualify under Congress's test may
reasonably be presumed to have greater affinity to the United States); Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (allowing lesser standard of scrutiny when
Congress delegates power to Executive); see also O'BRIEN, supra note 78, at 1503-05
(noting state and federal laws have discriminated against aliens); Mitchell Kurfis,
The Constitutionality of California's Proposition 187: An Equal Protection Analysis, 32
CMAi. W. L. REv. 129, 137 (1995) (noting "a statutory discrimination will not be set
aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it").
87. Compare Diaz, 426 U.S. at 67 (ruling federal government is able to distin-
guish between lawful permanent residents and citizen in allocating federal wel-
fare), with Richardson, 403 U.S. at 365 (prohibiting Pennsylvania and Arizona from
denying aliens welfare benefits). An analogy of Diaz and Graham "is so powerful
that the Court's heavy reliance on the unique nature of federal authority over
immigration sounds wholly irrational." Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 90; see
also Henkin, Constitution as Compact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 17 (arguing
that Supreme Court never held that congressional act discriminated against aliens
in violation of equal protection).
88. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1953).
89. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216 (failing to take into account special equities);
Knauff 338 U.S. at 547 (same). For example, Knauff's marriage to a U.S. soldier
and Mezei's lengthy residence in the United States were completely discounted
once the Court characterized these cases as challenges to immigration law and
therefore, beyond judicial review. For a discussion of Knauff and Mezei, see supra
notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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law.90 Apart from these criticisms, difficulties with this distinction
arise because it does not explain recent "immigration law" cases in
which the federal government's plenary power was challenged suc-
cessfully.91 It also does not explain cases seemingly outside the
realm of immigration law in which aliens' rights, while expected to
be protected, were ultimately not protected. 92 Some commentators
offer theories for the "blur" between the plenary power doctrine
and the aliens' rights tradition.93 By virtually ignoring the plenary
power versus aliens' rights distinction, however, alternative theories
can be offered to explain a developing pattern. These theories are
illustrated best in the cases of Landon v. Plasencia94 and United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez.9 5
A. Landon v. Plasencia: Defeating the Plenary Power Doctrine
The Supreme Court in Plasencia held that a lawful permanent
resident returning to the United States is entitled to the same due
process protections as a resident who never left.96 In so modifying
90. Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1063-65; Scaperlanda, Partial Membership, supra
note 78; Scaperlanda, Polishing the Golden Door, supra note 40, at 991-1002.
91. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 41 (1982) (holding government can-
not present case without opposition when permanent resident alien's substantial
interest in remaining in country is at stake); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449
(1963) (preventing government from saying alien intended to depart after taking
brief trip); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (holding Attorney
General has no authority to deny entry to permanent resident alien of United
States). For a further discussion of Plasencia, see infra notes 94-100 and accompa-
nying text.
92. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (holding
no Fourth Amendment warrantless "search and seizure" protection for nonresi-
dent alien's foreign property); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S 67, 80 (1976) (limiting
Social Security benefits to permanent residents living in United States for at least
five years); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (limiting First Amend-
ment rights of U.S. citizens who want to bring known Marxist to United States to
speak); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608 (1960) (ruling deportee is not enti-
fled to Social Security benefits).
93. See Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 27, at 607 (noting misdirected
judicial review as problem for unpredictable solutions); Motomura, Procedural Sur-
rogates, supra note 27, at 1646 (noting Court's readiness to recognize procedural
due process as formal exception to plenary power doctrine stood in tension with its
unwillingness to give procedural due process requirement any real content); Tay-
lor, supra note 27, at 1134-35 (noting boundary between plenary power doctrine
and aliens' rights is not easily marked).
94. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
95. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
96. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 21. In Plasencia, the Court modified part of the hold-
ing in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) and extended
procedural due process protection in exclusion proceedings to returning lawful
permanent residents who had only been gone for a few days. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at
34. For a further discussion of Mezei, see supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
Plasencia did, however, reverse the understanding of Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S.
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the Mezei holding, the Plasencia Court reasoned that "once an alien
gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that
go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes ac-
cordingly. '97 In determining that an individual like Plasencia is en-
titled to due process protection, the Court remanded the case for a
determination of what process was due as an initial matter consis-
tent with the considerations set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.98
The Plasencia decision marked the firm establishment of the
notions of community ties and membership in determining what
due process was owed to aliens.99 According to Plasencia, if an indi-
vidual challenging an immigration law can demonstrate ties bind-
ing him or her to the national polity, that individual will receive
greater protection.100 This development was the culmination of a
line of cases which began with the minority voices of Fong Yue Ting
v. United States.101 Although more restrictive than Plasencia, the
plaintiff's special equities were also taken into consideration in
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding.102 Kwong Hai Chew's brief departure
from the United States did not trigger a statutory entry upon his
449 (1963), that returning residents be placed in deportation proceedings and
instead found that proper determination of the due process question should be in
exclusion proceedings. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32.
97. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32.
98. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
99. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32-37. The Plasencia Court stated:
In evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must consider the
interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable value of
additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the gov-
ernment in using the current procedures rather than additional or differ-
ent procedures.
Id. at 34 (relying on Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). For a
further discussion of the Eldridge test, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
100. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34-35. The Court in Plasencia further stated:
Plasencia's interest here is, without question, a weighty one. She stands
to lose the right "to stay and live and work in this land of freedom." Fur-
ther, she may lose the right to rejoin her immediate family, a right that
ranks high among the interests of the individual .... [T]he courts must
evaluate the particular circumstances and determine what procedures
would satisfy the minimum requirements of due process on the reentry of
a permanent resident alien.
Id. (citation omitted).
101. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). According to observers, the dissenters in Fong Yue
Ting suggested that resident aliens should be entitled to some constitutional pro-
tection because they have significant ties to the community. Taylor, supra note 27,
at 1136 n.251 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 737-38 (1893)
(Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 746 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 762 (Fuller, J., dis-
senting)). This notion also influenced the Japanese Immigrant Case, which entitles
aliens in deportation proceedings to procedural due process. Id. (citingJapanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903)).
102. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
[Vol. 41: p. 725744
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return, as this seaman, sailing for only four months on an American
ship with American security clearance, was "assimilated" to the sta-
tus of a resident alien who never left for purposes of procedural
due process safeguards.'03 This type of reasoning also was responsi-
ble for the development of the Rosenberg v. Fleuti' 0 4 doctrine which
prevents a permanent resident's brief, casual and innocent trip out
of the United States from creating a statutory entry upon return
because there is no meaningful interruptive departure. 105
Despite the fact that these cases clearly impacted upon sover-
eignty, the plenary power doctrine did not prevail.10 6 Yet, while
aliens were making strides in cases challenging immigration law,
victory was not to be found in the nonimmigration arena. 07 The
recent decision of Verdugo-Urquidez illustrates the losing battle of the
aliens' rights theory and reflects the Court's consideration of an
individual's membership and ties to the United States in determin-
ing what protections are due.
B. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Defeating the Aliens'
Rights Tradition
Writing for the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rhen-
quist found that the Fourth Amendment had no application to the
search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a
103. Id. at 596.
104. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
105. The Fleuti Court held that a permanent resident's few hour trip to Mex-
ico was "innocent, casual and brief," and therefore, not meaningfully interruptive
departure that would trigger statutory "entry" upon return. Id. at 462-63. It ap-
pears that INA § 101 (a) (13), which has traditionally provided the statutory basis
for the Fleuti doctrine, has been narrowed to allow only for specific instances in
which a lawful permanent resident's departure and return will not be considered a
"meaningfully interruptive departure." IIRAIRA § 301(a), Pub. L. No. 104-208
(1996) (amending INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C.). For a further discussion of
IIRAIRA, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
106. Courts have also indicated that they are less inclined to give absolute
deference to the federal political branches in those cases which can be character-
ized as "inside" immigration law. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 857 (1985)
(noting INS officials must exercise their discretion under nondiscriminatory pa-
role provisions without regard to race or national origin); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 793 n.5 (1977) (stating "[o]ur cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial
responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress
to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens"); Japanese Immigrant Case, 189
U.S. 86, 99-100 (1903) (noting administrative officer may not disregard fundamen-
tal principles of due process of law); see also Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1092-94
(noting courts have not absolutely foreclosed use of judicial review of govern-
ment's substantive immigration decisions).
107. See Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1095-98 (discussing rights that attach as
result of "territorial presence" in case of Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
239 (1896)).
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nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.' 08 The Court
held that Verdugo-Urquidez was not a person within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 10 9 According to Chief Justice Rhen-
quist, "the people" referred to in the Fourth Amendment are "a
class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community." n0 In Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion, the respondent did not exemplify these traits.11'
While the Verdugo-Urquidez decision may arguably have been meant
to impact only the rights of nonresident aliens without ties to the
United States, the decision already has affected lawful permanent
residents of the United States. 112 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit recently suggested that lawful perma-
nent residents may not have sufficient ties to the United States to
108. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261, 264-75 (1990).
This case involved an alleged Mexican drug lord and murderer of Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena Salazar. Id. at 262. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez had been seized by Mexican police and delivered to a California border
station. Id. The next day, while incarcerated in San Diego, DEA agents, along with
Mexican police, searched his home in Mexicali, Mexico and found evidence of his
narcotics smuggling. Id. While the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit suppressed the evidence as a violation of the Fourth Amendment warrant
clause, the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 263, 275. Additionally, by the time this
case reached the Supreme Court, Verdugo-Urquidez, in a separate prosecution,
had been convicted for his involvement in the torture-murder of DEA agent
Salazar. Id. at 262.
Six Justices, in three different opinions, held that the search was not a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment because the Fourth Amendment had no applica-
tion to the search of a nonresident alien's property in a foreign country. Id. at 275-
78. Three Justices dissented. Id. at 261. Justice Kennedy, while joining the major-
ity, wrote a concurring opinion which observers suggest so drastically diverges
from the majority that the opinion may only speak for a plurality of four. Id. at
275; see Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 30, at 972, 974 n.378 (discussing
Verdugo-Urquidez opinion). The decision in Verdugo-Urquidez has resulted in discus-
sion of Fourth Amendment protections and aliens. See id. at 912, 971-76 (discuss-
ing Fourth Amendment rights and aliens); Michael Scaperlanda, The Domestic
Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens: To What Extent Do They Survive United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez?, 56 Mo. L. REv. 213, 217-27 (1991) (questioning applicability
of Fourth Amendment to aliens lawfully in United States) [hereinafter Scaper-
landa, Domestice Fourth Amendment Rights].
109. Verdugo-Urguidez, 494 U.S. at 264-66.
110. Id. at 265. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the First, Second,
Ninth and Tenth Amendments would also be inapplicable to the defendant be-
cause "[t]he language of these Amendments contrasts with the words 'person' and
,accused' used in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating procedure in crimi-
nal cases." Id. at 265-66.
111. Id. at 274.
112. See United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting it
is unclear whether noncitizen defendants are entitled to Fourth Amendment pro-
tection after Verdugo-Urquidez), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 813 (1996).
[Vol. 41: p. 725
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invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment outside of the
U.S. territorial boundaries.11 3
Other weaknesses in the aliens' rights doctrine are revealed in
cases where the litigants had limited ties to the United States.114
For example, an alien previously deported for past Communist
membership was denied Social Security benefits in Flemming v. Nes-
tor. 1 15 In addition, the Court restricted a permanent resident's abil-
ity to qualify for Social Security, holding that the awarding of
benefits applies only to individuals who had been permanent resi-
dents for more than five years and therefore, could be considered
the "most like citizens," in Mathews v. Diaz.116
113. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that even if the Fourth Amendment, as in-
terpreted in Verdugo-Urquidez, applies to nonresident aliens, wiretaps of telephone
conversations in foreign country, that were conducted as joint operation of both
United States and foreign law enforcement officials, satisfied Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement, regardless of whether there was probable cause be-
cause they were conducted in compliance with law of country in which they took
place. Id.; see also Supreme Court Declines Review of Alien's Fourth Amendment Rights in
Foreign Seizure, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 138 (1996) (discussing Verdugo-Urguidez).
But see Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 816 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting Fifth
Amendment due process rights available to undocumented alien brought to
United States as prosecution witness); Recent Immigration Decisions in the Federal
Courts, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 726, 730-31 (1996) (discussing Wong Zong Xiao).
114. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967) (requiring permanent residence
of five years to qualify for social security benefits); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603 (1960) (denying social security benefits to alien who was formerly
communist).
115. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). The Court found that a rational justification ex-
isted for the denial of Social Security benefits, and therefore, did not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 611. For the Court, a de-
portee's residence abroad is of "obvious relevance" to justifying the denial of bene-
fits. Id. at 612. The deportee's place of residence prevents the benefit of
"increased over-all national purchasing power" as he or she cannot spend his or
her Social Security check in the United States as can recipients living in the United
States. Id. Additionally, it cannot "be deemed irrational for Congress to have con-
cluded that the public purse should not be utilized to contribute to the support of
those deported." Id.; see also Taylor, supra note 27, at 1137 (noting Flemming
Court's rationale).
116. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83-84 (discussing resident alien's unsuccessful challenge
to Social Security Act provision that imposed five year residence requirement on
aliens). Perhaps not so coincidentally, an individual generally needs to be a per-
manent resident for five years before he or she is entitled to citizenship. INA
§ 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 427(a) (1994). Bosniak finds Diaz to be one of the "clearest
examples" of the suggestion that membership concerns impact upon issues seem-
ingly "outside" immigration law. Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1065-67. But see Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (noting ability of states to apply their
immigration laws to their alien inhabitants is confined by narrow limits). Contrast-
ing Graham and Diaz, Bosniak recognizes that the Graham decision is based on the
"irrelevance" of immigration principles for the states, while the Diaz Court found
the case involved an extension of the federal government's immigration power
through the challenged provisions of the Social Security Act. Bosniak, supra note
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C. Commenting on the Battle
Concern over the rights of individuals arising from cases such
as Verdugo-Urquidez, Nestor and Diaz exemplifies a struggle between
the aliens' rights tradition and the plenary power doctrine in which
the plenary power doctrine prevails.'1 7 It has been suggested that
these cases curb the strides of the aliens' rights tradition by allowing
judicial deference to any federal action affecting aliens. 11 8 Conse-
quently, attempts are made to fight Congress's plenary power in-
truding into the aliens' rights arena. Yet, simultaneously a battle is
waged to encourage the Court's concern for fundamental rights to
cross the border into the immigration arena. These efforts conflict
as they encourage maintaining the plenary power versus aliens'
rights distinction in cases outside the immigration arena, while ar-
guing for the abolishment of the distinction when presented with
challenges to immigration law.
Difficulty in maintaining the plenary power versus aliens' rights
boundary suggests that the proper distinction in deciding whether
an alien is entitled to constitutional protection is not whether his or
her case falls "inside" or "outside" of immigration law."I9 Rather,
the cases which contradict the premises of the plenary power doc-
trine and the aliens' rights tradition may be understood more easily
if one considers an alien's "ties" or "membership" in the U.S. na-
tional community. 120
For a discussion of the legislative restrictions placed on a lawful permanent
resident's right to welfare through the recent Welfare Act, see supra notes 12-13
and accompanying text.
117. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding
Fourth Amendment does not apply to search and seizure of alien resident's prop-
erty); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (holding alien cannot receive social
security benefits); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (same).
118. See Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 27, at 585 (noting that Con-
gress makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens); Motomura,
Procedural Surrogates, supra note 27, at 1693 (suggesting that Congress's immigra-
tion decisions "are largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference");
Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 30, at 972 (discussing Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez which gave three conclusions as to why aliens do
not have constitutional rights); Scaperlanda, Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights,
supra note 108, at 231-42 (noting Congress has broad discretion in controlling
immigration law); Scaperlanda, Marshall'sJurisprudence, supra note 25, at 68-69 n.83
(discussing Verdugo-Urquidez and its break from exception that aliens are entitled to
protection from Bill of Rights); Taylor, supra note 27, at 1135-39 (discussing cases
giving judicial deference to congressional statutes).
119. For a criticism of the preoccupation with the immigration law versus
nonimmigration law distinction, see Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1066-67.
120. See Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 922 (rejecting
plenary power); Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29 (noting living with family
members is substantial interest); Martin, supra note 28, at 172 (noting Due Process
748 [Vol. 41: p. 725
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V. NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP AND COMMUNITY TIES
A. Professor David Martin: Membership in the National Community
For Professor Martin, due process determinations are a func-
tion of one's "membership in the national community." 121 Martin
suggests rectifying the disparate treatment of aliens by basing treat-
ment upon degrees of membership, rather than categorizing cases
as plenary power or aliens' rights. 122 For Martin:
[W]e, as a national community, somehow owe less in the
coin of procedural assurances to the first-time applicant
for admission than we do to our fellow citizens or to per-
manent resident aliens, or even to regular nonimmigrants
who have been among us for awhile. This is not necessar-
ily to say that we owe nothing; that would be to repeat the
mistakes of Knauff and Mezei. Instead it is simply to assert
that established community ties, which exist to varying de-
grees with respect to different categories of aliens, ought
to count in deciding what process is due. Or perhaps the
intuition is more accurately stated the other way around.
We owe more procedural guarantees-a greater assurance
of scrupulous factual accuracy-to citizens and-permanent
resident aliens than we do to aliens at the threshold of
entry into the national community. 12 3
Clause requires as constitutional minimum that aliens establish links to this coun-
try). In finding the inside/outside distinction to be an overstated generalization,
Bosniak recognizes that even in outside immigration law, alienage is used to ac-
cord aliens less "constitutional and subconstitutional" rights and benefits. Bos-
niak, supra note 27, at 1063-65. Discussing Michael Walzer, a political theorist
concerned with the political community's "sphere of membership," Bosniak recog-
nizes that there is an increasing convergence of what he refers to as the admissions
(or membership) sphere and the political (or equal personhood) sphere. (The
spheres mentioned in this article relate to the immigration and nonimmigration
arenas, respectively). Id. at 1069-87; see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:
A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALrIY (1985) (discussing spheres of justice for
aliens). "[A]lienage legitimately matters not merely at the border but for the allo-
cation of rights and benefits in the interior as well." Bosniak, supra note 27, at
1086; see also Scaperlanda, Polishing the Golden Door, supra note 40, at 996 (discuss-
ing Court's decision allowing aliens to get civil service employment); Taylor, supra
note 27, at 1136 (discussing Wing Wong progeny which extended constitutional
protection to aliens in criminal proceedings).
121. Martin, supra note 28, at 235; see also Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of
Aliens, supra note 26, at 868 (discussing notions of "membership"); Aleinikoff, Com-
munity Ties, supra note 29, at 242 (same); T. Alexander Aeinikoff, The Tightening
Circle of Membership, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 920-21 (1995) (same); Bosniak,
supra note 27, at 1068 (same); Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 78 (same).
122. Martin, supra note 28, at 191.
123. Id. at 191-92 (emphasis added).
1996]
25
Kelly: Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing Not
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOvA LAW REVIEW
Martin points out that a large part of what is meant by commu-
nity, including national community, is that relational obligations
exist. 124 It is not a novel idea to suggest that "special, heightened
obligations" attach as a result of special relationships.1 25 Our obli-
gations to the national community are compared by analogy to the
obligations which result by being a member of a family or a neigh-
bor in a community. 126
B. Professor Alexander Aleinikoff" Community Ties
While Martin relies on consideration of community ties in his
discussion of membership in the national community, Professor
Aleinikoff distinguishes these terms. 127 In distinguishing the terms,
Aleinikoff relies not on the premise of membership in the national
community, but solely on the notion of community ties. To
Aleinikoff:
It seems that the problem is not so much in accepting Pro-
fessor Martin's intuition that we "owe less in the coin of
procedural assurances of the first-time applicant for ad-
mission than we do to our fellow citizens or to permanent
resident aliens." Rather, it is trying to elaborate on that
intuition in terms of membership in a national commu-
nity. It is my belief that our intuition does not depend
upon inchoate notions of membership. I think it is more
easily explained as a generalization about the stake that
certain groups of aliens have in entering or residing in the
United States or in not being returned to their country of
origin. In short, whereas Professor Martin would examine
the notion of community, I would look at community ties.128
124. Id. at 193. This characteristic of community exists for Martin whether
one believes that a community has developed for practical reasons (i.e., shared
purposes) or if it has developed naturally, through shared history. Id. at 195.
125. Id. at 193 & n.101. Martin finds support for this idea from various
sources. See id. (relying on JAMES FISHKIN, THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION 25-38 (1982);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-16, 342-50, 375-77 (1971); A. John Sim-
mons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations 16-23 (1981); Gorovitz, Bigotry,
Loyalty, and Malnutrition, in FOOD POLICY: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED
STATES IN LIFE AND DEATH CHOICES 129, 132-36 (P. Brown & H. Shue eds., 1977);
H.LA. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHILA. REv. 175 (1955); William N.
Nelson, Special Rights, General Rights, and Social Justice, 3 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 410
(1974)).
126. Id. at 193. But see Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 240-41
(criticizing this analogy).
127. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 244-45.
128. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
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For Aleinikoff, community ties indicate "the actual relation-
ships the individual has developed with a society: a family, friends, a
job, association memberships, professional acquaintances, opportu-
nities."1 29 . In rejecting Martin's notion, Aleinikoff compares consid-
eration of community ties with community and finds:
"Community" is a more amorphous concept. It connotes
a sense of identification with others as a group, a sense of
common enterprise, a belief in the value of shared exper-
iences and a shared future. Community ties are almost
tangible; we can see interactions among people and mem-
bership in complex social and financial arrangements.
But to see "community," we must catch a glimpse of the
Zeitgeist, we must peer into people's hearts.130
Aleinikoff sees part of an alien's interest "in entering or re-
maining within the United States [to be] his or her ability to main-
tain established ties with the community."131 Having characterized
these ties as the "private interest" component of the Matthews v. El-
dridge framework, Aleinikoff suggests that one can only proceed to
fully satisfy all due process concerns after analyzing the remaining
Eldridge components.132 Aleinikoff acknowledges that even in using
the community ties approach, reasonable people might disagree as
to the level of ties of each group and whether there are actual dif-
ferences between them.1 33 Left is the implication that evaluating all
of the interests at stake will not always lead to the alien's interests
prevailing over the government's interest.
VI. REVEALING THE COURTS' USE OF MEMBERSHIP AND
COMMUNITY TIES
A. Applying the Theories
Despite the plenary power doctrine, numerous challenges to
immigration law are successful as the courts consider such equities
129. Id.
130. Id. at 244-45.
131. Id. at 245.
132. Id. at 247. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court clearly
set out the three elements to be balanced in determining the appropriate due
process conferred. Id. at 335 These elements include: (1) the private interest at
stake; (2) the value of improved procedures to prevent "erroneous deprivation" of
the private interest through existing procedures; and (3) the governmental inter-
est involved (including "fiscal and administrative burdens" imposed by any added
procedure). Id.
133. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 245-46.
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as membership in the national community and community ties.134
Conversely, aliens, perhaps anticipating victory when challenging a
law seemingly within the aliens' rights tradition, do not always suc-
ceed when the requisite community ties or national membership
are lacking. 135 The greater a court's reliance upon notions of mem-
bership or community ties, the more irrelevant the plenary power
versus aliens' rights distinction becomes. Beginning with a discus-
sion of the rights of U.S. citizens, this next section will attempt to
demonstrate that the weaker an individual's claim to membership
or community ties, the less rights are provided within both the im-
migration and nonimmigration law arenas.
B. Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents
In applying the premise of either Martin's membership or
Aleinikoff's community ties theory to U.S. citizens, one would con-
clude that citizens deserve the greatest constitutional protection be-
cause they occupy the innermost ring of the community and
arguably possess the strongest community ties. 13 6 Not surprisingly,
in cases involving the denaturalization or expatriation of citizens,
the courts impose many procedural and substantive safeguards. 137
134. For a discussion of those cases challenging immigration laws, see supra
notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
135. For a discussion of the success of challenges under the aliens' rights tra-
dition, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
136. Martin, supra note 28, at 208-10. Aleinikoff borrows Martin's concentric
circles of membership as "proxies" for the amount and kinds of ties each group
has developed and concludes that, "citizens, in the innermost circle, are likely to
have the greatest stake in remaining in the United States." Aleinikoff, Community
Ties, supra note 29, at 245. In measuring commitment to national community,
Aleinikoff points out that it is not clear that citizens, simply by virtue of their birth,
are more committed to the United States than aliens who have overcome great
obstacles to reach our shores. Id. at 241. Martin recognizes that while it may not
seem fair to accord citizens greater due process rights simply by virtue of their
birth, persons have to accept some of life's natural injustices. Martin, supra note
28, at 216-18 (relying on ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 134
(1975); Anthony Kronman, Talent Pooling, in XXII NoMos: HUMAN RIGHTS 58, 77
(1981)).
It should be noted that Martin and Aleinikoff, in the strictest sense, are dis-
cussing only the procedural rights of individuals based upon notions of member-
ship or community ties. I am, however, applying their theories more liberally to
explain differentiations in both substantive and procedural rights of citizens, law-
ful permanent residents and others based on their notions of membership and
community ties.
137. SeeAfroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 260 (1967). In expatriating proceed-
ings, intent (voluntary renunciation) is required. Id. at 265-66; see Vance v. Ter-
razas, 444 U.S. 252, 268 (1980) (noting party claiming expatriation must show
intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship). The Afroyim Court relied not on the Due
Process Clause, but on the citizenship provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268. The Court in Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), created
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Consistent with either Martin's or Aleinikoff's theory, in cases
which involve the stripping of a lawful permanent resident's right
to membership, the resident is given less protection than the U.S.
citizen.1 38 Unlike a U.S. citizen, the government does not need to
prove a lawful permanent resident's intent to abandon his status. 13 9
an exception to Afrayim's holding that citizenship must be voluntarily renounced
or relinquished. Id. at 835. Subsequent legislation, however, essentially invali-
dated this exception. See 4 CHARLEs GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 100.03[2] [a] [vi]-[b] [i] (1990) (discussing legislation invali-
dating exception). In expatriating proceedings, the government must meet its
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268.
Historically, however, this standard was not enforced. For example, in a case later
overruled, the Court held that voting in a foreign election qualified as an expatri-
ating act without even assessing the proof of intent to surrender citizenship. Perez
v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled by Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268. Also, a U.S.
citizen, lost her citizenship after marrying a foreigner. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239
U.S. 299, 311 (1915). The woman could only regain her citizenship upon termina-
tion of the marriage. Id. at 307. The Court found that.Congress, through its sover-
eign power, could deem marriage to be an expatriating act. Id. at 311-12. This
statute, the Citizenship Act of 1907, was later repealed. See Martin, supra note 28,
at 208-09 (discussing overruling of Citizenship Act by requiring intent to give up
citizenship); Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 71 (discussing how Congress had
power to expatriate).
Denaturalization proceedings also hold the government to a high standard.
See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (stating "clear, une-
quivocal and convincing" standard). Naturalized citizens are not more vulnerable
to losing their citizenship than born citizens. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165-
69 (1964). Before a denaturalization decree is issued, there must be a finding of
fraud or illegality in the original naturalization process. See generally Fedorenko v.
United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505-06 (1981) (noting government has heavy burden
of proof to divest naturalized citizen of his or her citizenship). The government
must prove its allegations by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence."
Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125; see also Martin, supra note 28, at 208-10 (discussing
government's burden).
138. Martin, supra note 28, at 210-15. Aleinikoff, however, suggests that, with
the exception of voting and political rights, lawful permanent residents should be
accorded membership in society equal to that of citizens. Aleinikoff, Citizens,
Aliens, Membership, supra note 40, at 23. Aleinikoff, therefore, questions whether it
is defensible to deport residents when the United States would not consider de-
porting a citizen for a similar offense. Id. at 26.
139. See INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994) (IIRAIRA § 305 has recodified
grounds of deportation so that they will be referred to as (INA § 237)) (providing
that lawful permanent residents can be deported for committing certain acts or by
failing to commit others against their wishes); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32
(1954) (deporting long time permanent residents for earlier Communist member-
ship); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952) (noting aliens remain
vulnerable to expulsion even after long residence); KURZBAN, supra note 4, at 81-
99. Recognizing the length of one's membership in U.S. society, Martin suggests
that these cases yielded bad results because of an unquestioning deference to sov-
ereignty and the political question issue. Martin, supra note 28, at 211-12. Martin
argues that the protection of lawful permanent residents could have been achieved
in these cases without any negative impact on Congress's political power over sub-
stantive deportation standards. Id. Aliens who have a "lawful unrehnquished dom-
icile of seven consecutive years" or more, however, have traditionally been able to
have certain grounds for deportation waived. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
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Yet, even in these cases, procedural due process is protected. 140 De-
portation must be based upon "clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence." 141 Despite all of its failings, even the Knauff-Mezei doc-
trine recognizes that certain rights attach if an alien has "passed
through our gates, even illegally."'142
Likewise, in what might be considered nonimmigration law/
aliens' rights cases, constitutional rights are contingent upon dem-
onstrating national membership or community ties. 143 Again, as in
the immigration context, the U.S. citizen occupying the innermost
circle of membership is accorded the greatest protection in the
nonimmigration arena.144 For example, the right to vote or hold
certain public offices is awarded only to citizens upon a recognition
of their status. 145
While there is disagreement regarding the amount of rights
which should be accorded lawful permanent residents, the disa-
For a discussion of the "cancellation of removal" relief that will replace INA
§ 212(c) relief pursuant to IIRAIRA, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
140. See Martin, supra note 28, at 212 (discussing protection of lawful perma-
nent residents).
141. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966); see also IIRAIRA § 304, Pub. L.
No. 104-208 (1996) (to be codified at INA § 240(c) (3) (A), 8 U.S.C.) (discussing
deportation). For a further discussion of IIRAIRA, see supra note 11 and accompa-
nying text.
142. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). Ig-
noring this widely accepted and long held principal that those who entered with-
out inspection are deportable and can avail themselves of greater procedural
protection, the 1996 changes to the INA limit the procedural rights to those here
who entered without inspection (EWI) by rendering them inadmissable. Compare
IIRAIRA § 301 (to be codified at INA § 212(a) (6) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C.) (stating new
ground of admissability), with INA § 241 (a) (1) (B) (stating previous ground of de-
portability). For a further discussion of EWIs and their rights, and the critiques of
Aleinikoff and Martin, see infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
143. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (limiting social security bene-
fits to permanent residents living in United States for at least five years); Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608 (1960) (ruling deportee is not entitled to social secur-
ity benefits).
144. See Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 245. Aleinikoff argues
that "[c]itizens in the innermost circle are likely to have the greatest stake in re-
maining in the United States." Id.
145. Martin, supra note 28, at 197. For a further discussion of an alien citi-
zen's political rights, see supra note 80 and accompanying text. Martin asserts that
the voting exception continues because of the intuitive notion that voting is inti-
mately associated with the idea of a national community. Martin, supra note 28, at
198. He notes:
Even Gerald Rosberg, after patiently dissecting all the instrumental rea-
sons (such as concerns about fraud, bloc voting, lack of knowledge, or
disloyalty) that states might advance to justify excluding resident aliens
from the polls, admitted to a lingering intuition about a hard-to-pin-down
justification for this exclusion, somehow connected to the notion of
membership.
Id. at 198 n.119.
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greement simply reflects differing opinions regarding the strength
of lawful permanent residents' community ties and membership. t46
Although some courts and commentators suggest that lawful per-
manent residents should be accorded constitutional protection on
par to that accorded citizens, 47 the opposing camp argues that a
resident is a lesser member of the community than the citizen and
accordingly, should be afforded less protection.1 48 For example,
the Court in Mathews v. Diaz suggested that all permanent residents
may not be accorded the same rights as citizens. 149 The Court sug-
gested that only individuals who have been permanent residents for
more than five years can be considered the "most like citizens."' 50
Serving as Justice, Rehnquist has also suggested that providing pro-
tection to noncitizen residents diminishes those rights which
should be safeguarded as the rewards of citizenship. 51 Only natu-
ralized citizens should be accorded certain rights for demonstrating
"the willingness and ability to integrate into our social system ...
[and prove they have] become 'like' a native-born citizen in ways
that aliens, as a class, could be presumed not to be."' 52 This senti-
ment, that all aliens, regardless of their residency status, are not
entitled to certain rights as they do not fully belong to the national
146. See Martin, supra note 28, at 193-204 (discussing arguments surrounding
strength of lawful permanent resident's community ties and membership).
147. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (noting that due process applies
to deprivation of license); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (noting school disci-
pline must comply with due process). Justice Blackmun suggested "for most legis-
lative purposes there simply are no meaningful differences between resident aliens
and citizens." Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The
dissent in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), noted that "[a]n alien,
who is assimilated in our society, is treated as a citizen so far as his property and his
liberty are concerned." Id. at 599 (Douglas, J., dissenting). While recognizing that
the greatest due process is reserved for citizens, Martin accepts that in legal mat-
ters which do not bear on the resident's membership, lawful permanent residents
should be accorded the same due process as citizens. Martin, supra note 28, at 210.
Aleinikoff suggests supporting equal rights for citizens and lawful permanent resi-
dents in all nonfranchise matters. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 244-
47; Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, supra note 40, at 19-20.
148. See Diaz, 426 U.S. at 67 (discussing differences afforded residents and
citizens); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649-64 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (same); Martin, supra note 28, at 208-34 (discussing various amounts of due
process afforded to different members of national community). Similarly, the re-
strictions imposed on the right to federal benefits through the recent Welfare Act
reflect the 104th Congress's belief that lawful permanent residents should be ac-
corded less rights than citizens. For a further discussion of the recent Welfare Act
and its restrictions, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
149. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83-84.
150. Id. at 83. For a further discussion of Diaz, see supra note 114 and accom-
panying text.
151. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 658-61 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
152. Id. at 661 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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community, has been reflected on occasion in other Supreme
Court cases.153
C. Undocumented Aliens in the United States
In terms of the rights of United States citizens and lawful per-
manent residents, Martin and Aleinikoff seem in general agree-
ment.' 54 Their theories, however, begin to diverge when applied to
the next outlying circle, undocumented aliens living in the United
States who either evaded inspection by the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) upon entering the country or who arrived
as nonimmigrants or parolees. 55
153. See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904) (not-
ing "those who are excluded cannot assert the rights in general obtained in a land
to which they do not belong as citizens or otherwise"); United States v. Barona, 56
F.3d. 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that nonresidents failed to show they
were "people of the United States" entitled to all constitutional rights), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 813 (1996); see also Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 77-79 (discussing
Supreme Court's concept that aliens are outsiders to U.S. society). Membership
concerns have also crossed the immigration/nonimmigration line by limiting a
permanent resident's ability to exercise his or her First Amendment rights. See
American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese ("ADC"), 714 F. Supp. 1060,
1078-81 (C.D. Cal. 1989), affd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 940 F.2d 445
(9th Cir.), vacated 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1991). In ADC, the district court found
that it could not tolerate alienage-citizen distinctions which would limit an alien's
First Amendment rights. Id. at 1078-79. The court struck down the challenged
McCarran-Walter provisions, which proscribed various forms of advocating com-
munist or dictatorship theories, as facially overbroad. Id. at 1078-84. The district
court's constitutional holding was reversed and vacated on appeal because the case
was not ripe. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d
501, 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1991). The McCarran-Walter provisions at issue were ulti-
mately repealed and replaced with other provisions which allowed the deportation
of aliens who engaged in terrorist activity. See American-Arab Anti Discrimination
Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1054 (1995) (challenging deportation under terror-
ism provisions). For a thorough discussion of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimina-
tion cases, see Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1130-37.
154. See Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 245 (discussing state of
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents); Martin, supra note 28, at 208-15
(addressing due process for citizens and lawful permanent residents).
155. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 245-47; Martin, supra note
28, at 166, 230-34. At the time of Aleinikoff's and Martin's writing, the INA de-
fined entry to include EWI. INA § 101(a) (13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (13) (1990); see
also Matter of Z, Int. Dec. No. 3208 (BIA 1993) (discussing entry); Matter of Patel,
Int. Dec. No. 3157 (BIA 1991) (same). Martin focuses on individuals that he refers
to as "clandestine entrants," but he does not discuss with great specificity the rights
of other aliens in the United States who are not permanent residents such as parol-
ees and aliens who have entered the country legally on a valid tourist or other
nonimmigrant visa. Martin, supra note 28, at 166, 230-34. His thoughts regarding
clandestine entrants would likely apply generally to anyone not formally admitted
as a permanent resident. Aleinikoff criticizes Martin for not adequately addressing
differences within both the circle referred to as first time entrants and undocu-
mented aliens living in the country. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at
245-47. The INA has given a legal definition of "entry" stating that entry:
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Under Aleinikoff's community ties theory, the undocumented
alien who resides in the United States after an entry without inspec-
tion would be accorded due process in relation to the community
ties he or she has developed. 156 These ties define his or her stake in
the community. 157 In relying upon this theory of community ties,
as opposed to Martin's notion of membership, one values the stake
an individual has made here in determining the amount of due
process owed. 158
Martin suggests these "clandestine entrants" should not be
given greater constitutional rights than the first time applicant for
admission, despite the length of time or other ties they may have in
the United States. 159 For Martin, because these individuals did not
enter the national community with its permission, the national
community was prevented from exercising the right to determine
[M]eans any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign
part or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or
otherwise, except that an alien having lawful permanent residence in the
United States shall not be regarded as making an entry ... if the alien
proves . . .that his departure . . . [from the United States] was not in-
tended or reasonably expected by him or his presence [outside the
United States] . . .was not voluntary: Provided, that no person whose
departure ... was occasioned by deportation proceedings, extradition, or
other legal process shall be held to be entitled to such exception.
INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). Entry has also been defined as: (1)
crossing into the territorial limits of the United States, i.e., physical presence; (2)
an inspection and admission by an immigration officer; (3) actual and intentional
evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point coupled with; (4) freedom
from restraint. See KuRZBAN, supra note 4, at 25 (citing Matter of Z, Int. Dec. No.
3208 (BIA 1993) (finding entry when person came within federal jurisdiction for
reasons unrelated to immigration processing); Matter of Patel, Int. Dec. No. 3157
(BIA 1991) (finding no entry on account of lack of freedom from restraint where
permanent resident alien was deferred for customs inspection after passing pri-
mary immigration inspection)). Now, pursuant to the INA as amended by
IIRAIRA in 1996, an individual has only entered if it has been a lawful admission,
requiring an inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. IIRAIRA
§ 301, Pub. L. No, 104-208 (1996) (amending INA § 101 (a)(13), 8 U.S.C.). For a
further discussion of IIRAIRA, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
156. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 245-46. Under provisions of
the 1996 immigration legislation, those individuals who Aleinikoff discusses as hav-
ing "entered" without inspection and subject to deportation will now be character-
ized as having "arrived" without being admitted or paroled and will be
inadmissable rather than deportable. IIRAIRA §§ 301(c), 302, 304 (to be codified
at INA §§ 212(a) (6) (A) (i), 235, 240, in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Even with
the enactment of IIRAIRA, Aleinikoff's theory, as discussed in this Article, would
still allow one to conclude that inadmissable individuals who arrive without legal
admission or parole are entitled to greater rights than the first time applicant for
admission. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 245-46.
157. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 245-46.
158. Id.
159. Martin, supra note 28, at 230-31.
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its members at a critical decision-making point.160 Consequently,
this group of undocumented individuals should be treated as first
time admission applicants when determining the amount of due
process they should be afforded.1 61
Yet, as undocumented aliens living in the United States have
generally been accorded more protections than applicants for ad-
mission, there appears to be a greater regard for the individual's
community ties than his or her formal admission as a member in
the national community. 162 Traditionally, undocumented aliens
discovered after entering the United States either with or without
inspection are afforded more substantive relief if they can demon-
strate a long residency in the United States and strong community
ties. 163 Additionally, individuals discovered by the INS have tradi-
160. Id.
161. Id. at 231. Martin believes that to allow greater due process protections
to a "clandestine entrant" than those afforded to a first time applicant for entry
would continue one of the most anomalous lessons learned from Knauff-Mezei. Id.
at 230 n.231. The lesson involved the realization that an individual who success-
fully evaded immigration and secretly entered the country is entitled to more pro-
tection than individuals who honestly present themselves to immigration at the
border. Id. This theory, which Martin advanced in 1983, charged that "the most
glaring anomaly of the Knauff-Mezei doctrine" is that it entitles individuals who
arrive clandestinely to be entitled to greater procedural protection than those le-
gally applying for admission at the border. Id. at 230; see also id. at 212-13, 230-34
(criticizing rights provided for those who evade inspection). Thus, Martin's theory
seems to be consistent with the 1996 immigration legislation charging individuals
who "arrive without inspection" as being inadmissable and thus entitled to less
protection. IIRAIRA §§301(c)(1), 302, 304 (to be codified at INA
§§ 212 (a) (6) (A) (i), 235, 240, in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
Yet, while asserting that the due process afforded to a clandestine entrant
should be limited, Martin believes that the entrant's length of stay and the ties
which he or she has developed should have a positive effect. Id. at 232-33. For
example, Martin recognizes suspension of deportation as a positive ameliorative
legislative measure. Id.; see also INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (discussing sus-
pension of deportation). With the recent repeal of suspension of deportation and
the heightened criteria enacted for "cancellation of removal," it becomes appar-
ent, however, that it may be unwise to fully rely on legislative protection for indi-
viduals who are here without proper inspection and admission. Compare INA
§ 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (discussing suspension of deportation), with IIRAIRA
§ 304 (to be codified at INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C.) (discussing cancellation of
removal).
162. For a further discussion of membership and community ties, see supra
notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
163. See INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (suspension of deportation);
IIRAIRA § 304 (to be codified at INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C.) (replacing suspension of
deportation with cancellation of removal); INA § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (registry);
IIRAIRA § 308(g) (10) (B) (amending registry); AEDPA § 413(e) (amending regis-
try); INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (voluntary departure); INA § 244(e), 8
U.S.C. § 1254(e) (voluntary departure); IIRAIRA § 304 (to be codified at INA
§ 240B, 8 U.S.C.) (replacing previous forms of voluntary departure); see also
IIRAIRA §§ 308(a) (7), (g) (5) (D) (repealing former provisions for suspension of
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tionally been assured more protection than individuals who are ap-
prehended upon attempting their first entry.164
In an attempt to restrict "illegal immigration," however, recent
legislative measures limit the procedural and substantive rights of
aliens who enter without inspection. 165 These measures reveal Con-
gress stepping back from its previous position, demonstrating Con-
gress's willingness to ignore an alien's ties to the community. 166
Congress has previously recognized the significance of community
membership by preventing the potential deportation of thousands
of undocumented aliens through such legalization programs as the
"amnesty."167 Presenting these programs to Congress, Attorney
General Smith stated: "We have neither the resources, the capabil-
ity, nor the motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal
aliens, many of whom have become, in effect, members of the
community."' 68
Outside of the immigration context, for undocumented aliens
who have not formally become members of the national commu-
nity, Martin's or Aleinikoff s theory seem to reach the same result.
These individuals have established ties and have been recognized as
members of the community to the degree that they are subject to
our criminal laws, participate in their local community, etc.169
deportation and voluntary departure). For further discussion of IIRAIRA, see
supra note 11.
164. For example, compare INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251, with INA § 212(a) (1), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1) (reflecting grounds of deportation are less encompassing than
grounds of exclusion as there is no comparable ground of deportation for carrying
of communicable disease). Moreover, in the case of deportable aliens, the burden
of proof is on the government to support a finding of deportability by "clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing evidence." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1976); see
also Martin, supra note 28, at 212-13 (discussing Court's requirement of due pro-
cess in deportation proceedings).
165. For a discussion of the recent changes in the immigration law, see supra
note 11-12 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the recent immigration legislation, see supra notes 11
and 12 and accompanying text.
167. See IRCA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(A) (1994) (stating amnesty provision);
GORDON ET AL., supra note 137, at § 52.01 (discussing amnesty provision of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(A)).
168. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.17 (1982); see also Martin, supra note
28, at 202 n.136 (discussing reasoning for amnesty programs).
169. See Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 245-46 (discussing stake
persons have in their community); Martin, supra note 28, at 202, 230-34 (arguing
against Court's recognition of greater procedural protections for clandestine en-
trants as opposed to less protections for first time applicants for admission). Ger-
ald Neuman finds that the constitutional rights of aliens present in the United
States correspond to their "pervasive subjection" to American law. Neuman, Whose
Constitution, supra note 30, at 977. But see Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1126-31 (sug-
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The courts historically have recognized the rights of these indi-
viduals based upon a respect for the ties they have developed. 170
For example, the Court suggests that even illegal aliens have ties to
the community which entitle them to certain rights in Plyler v.
Doe.17 1 Like Plyler, the Court rejected the notion that one's status as
an unlawful immigrant signifies that the individual is not entitled to
constitutional protection in Wong Wing v. United States.172 As the
Court held in Wong Wing, undocumented aliens living in the
United States generally enjoy full constitutional protection. 173 Yet,
the protection of these rights is, however, being challenged and at
risk of being undone by recent efforts both nationally and
locally.174
gesting that undocumented alien's ability to exercise his or her civil and political
rights is limited by omnipresent shadow of federal immigration authorities).
170. For a discussion of the cases recognizing the ties of an alien, see supra
notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
171. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (discussing right of illegal aliens to go to school); see
also Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, supra note 40, at 25 (recognizing that
undocumented children were likely to be permanent members of American soci-
ety); Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1098-99, 1115-17 (discussing provision for constitu-
tional protection regardless of undocumented alien status). Bosniak recognizes
that Plyler may be limited to a finding that an unlawful status is an irrelevant factor
for children, but not necessarily for adults. Id. at 1125 (noting "Pyleris not likely to
be very helpful in a case in which ... rights are denied to undocumented aliens
over the age of eighteen"). Bosniak concludes that the law is divided over the
difference undocumented alienage makes in an analysis. Id. at 1117-26. Another
commentator has also been suggested that Plyler was decided under the federal
preemption principle, and thus, is not a broad recognition of alien rights by the
Court. Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 79. For a discussion of recent federal
legislative efforts to prevent undocumented children from attending public
school, see infra note 174 and accompanying text.
172. 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); see also Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1095-98,
1115-17 (discussing Court's extension of constitutional protections to aliens in
cases outside sphere of immigration). For a further discussion of Wong Wing, see
supra note 78 and accompanying text.
173. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976) (noting "[e]ven one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involun-
tary, or transitory, is entitled to [Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment] protection").
But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261-62, 272, 274-75 (1990)
(holding Verdugo-Urquidez, who was brought involuntarily to United States, was
not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection); Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra
note 30, at 972 (discussing Verdugo-Urquidez). For a further discussion of Verdugo-
Urquidez, see supra notes 108-13 and infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
174. Efforts to bar undocumented children from public school failed only af-
ter the hotly debated provision sponsored by Representative Elton Gallegly (R-
Cal.) was dropped from the ITRAIRA and was sponsored by Gallegly as a separate
immigration bill. H.R. 4134, 104th Cong. (1996). After passing the House by a
254-175 vote, the bill was not taken up by the Senate. Bill to Block Illegal Immigration
Passed, Signed: Controversial Education Measure Cut, FACTs ON FILE, Oct. 3, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, News File; William Branigin, Congress Finishes Major Legislation; Immi-
gration; Focus Is Borders, Not Benefits, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at Al (discussing new
legislation); Eric Schmitt, Bill Tries to Balance Concerns on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
[Vol. 41: p. 725
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D. Applicants for Admission
For Martin, the first time applicants for admission occupy the
outermost ring of membership in the national community. 175 But,
unlike the Knauff Court, Martin recognizes these individuals' "com-
mon humanity" and acknowledges that they are entitled to the due
process protections applied in Yick Wo and found in the language of
the Due Process Clause referring to "all persons." 176 Martin believes
Sept. 29, 1996, § 1, at 28 (same); Text on President Clinton's Statement on Omnibus
Appropriations and Immigration Reform Bil4 U.S. NEwswIRE, Oct. 2, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News File; see also Immigration Bills Head to House-Senate Conference; Battles
Over Particulars Loom, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 678, 680 (1996) (discussing Gal-
legly amendment to House Bill 2202 allowing states to bar public education bene-
fits to undocumented aliens, including children); Conferees Agree on Immigration
Bill; Hill Negotiators Delete Schooling Ban; Clinton Undecided on Veto, WASH. POST, Sept.
25, 1996, at A14 (discussing alien children and school rights); David Hess, Senate
OKs Tightening the Border, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 1996, at Al (discussing Senate vote
to tighten border); Immigration Bill Attracts Broader Range of Opponents, WASH. POST,
Sept. 28, 1996, at A7 (discussing proposed bill); Eric Schmitt, Conferees Approve a
Tough Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, A15 (discussing proposed bill).
California's Proposition 187 also demonstrates an attempt to restrict the rights
of undocumented aliens living in the United States. See Bosniak, supra note 27, at
1143-47 (discussing Proposition 187's denial of basic public services to aliens); Ke-
vin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California's
Proposition 187, 70 WASH. L. REv. 629 (1995) (discussing Proposition 187); Kevin R.
Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnic-
ity, Gender and Class, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1509 (1995) (same); Kurfis, supra note 86, at
165 (arguing that portions of Proposition 187 deny equal protection to undocu-
mented alien children); GeraldL. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services,
Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1425,
1448-52 (1995) (arguing that Proposition 187 violates Equal Protection).
Initiatives similar to California's Proposition 187 are gaining the support of
voters in Florida. See Rick Barry, Amendment Backers Pen Hopes on Voters, TAMPA TRIB-
UNE, Jan. 17, 1996, at I (describing attempts to put anti-immigration initiatives on
Florida ballot); James G. Driscoll, Venom Aimed at Immigrants Destroys Their Precious
Dream of America, SUN-SENTINEL, May 18, 1996, at 15A (discussing anti-immigrant
sentiment); Prop. 187 Clones Advance, SUN-SENTINEL, May 16, 1996, at 3B (describ-
ing Florida petition driving voter initiative similar to Proposition 187); Reena Shah
Stamets, Benefits for Illegal Aliens Defended, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at
3B (describing local meeting defending benefits for illegal aliens); Andres
Viglucci, Immigration Hot Topic for Voters, Not Candidates, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.
12, 1996, at IA (describing presidential candidate's lack of comment on
immigration).
175. Martin, supra note 28, at 216.
176. Id. For Martin, "[t]he excludable alien is not a constitutional stranger,
but he is not quite intimate family .... Thus, the character of the excludable
alien's-as yet tenuous-relationship to the national polity may be used in decid-
ing what process is owed as a constitutional minimum." Id. Recognizing our uni-
versal common humanity, Justice Field in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893) stated:
The moment any human being from a country at peace with us comes
within the jurisdiction of the United States ... he becomes subject to all
their laws, is amenable to their punishment and entitled to their protec-
tion. Arbitrary and despotic power can no more be exercised over them
with reference to their persons and property, than over the persons and
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that an alien at entry should insist on minimum constitutional pro-
tections, including "an unbiased decision-maker, notice of the pro-
ceedings and of the general grounds asserted by the government
for denial of admission; a meaningful opportunity to dispute or
overcome those grounds, orally or in writing; and a statement of
reasons, even if oral and summary, for any adverse decision."'177
Martin, justifying different procedural protections for individuals
depending on their relative location to the border, argues that such
an approach serves as an essential and practical tool for courts. 178
Martin agrees with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit which acknowledged that "constitutional protections cannot
be afforded to the entire population of the world, and some distinc-
tion is necessary."79
Aleinikoff takes a more humanitarian approach to determin-
ing what rights should be afforded to each individual. 180 For
Aleinikoff, more than the minimal due process suggested by Martin
may exist for an individual, even a first time entrant at the bor-
der.' 8 1 The fact that an individual is an applicant for admission
does not definitively determine that he or she should be afforded
only the most minimal due process.' 82 There are "relevant differ-
ences" between individuals seeking entry.' 83 While recognizing
that an applicant for admission is likely to have fewer ties to the
United States than a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, an appli-
property of native-born citizens. They differ only from citizens in that
they cannot vote or hold any public office. As men having our common
humanity, they are protected by all the guaranties of the Constitution.
Id. at 754 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting); see also Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 242-43
(Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claiming that all persons are
entitled to equal protection of laws); Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)
(stating that Fourteenth Amendment "is not confined to the protection of citi-
zens"). For a further discussion of an individual alien's due process rights, see
supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
177. Martin, supra note 28, at 218. Martin cautions, however, that it is "haz-
ardous" to set out any procedural standards. Id.; see also INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S.
62, 79 & n.22 (1969) (refusing to consider Director's bias because case remanded
for new hearing); Henry M. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267,
1278-81 (1975) (noting danger of setting procedural standards).
178. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 239 (discussing Martin's
view).
179. Martin, supra note 28, at 233 (citing Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d
1281, 1290 (5th Cir.), vacated, 434 U.S. 962 (1977) (remanding for consideration
of mootness)).
180. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 239 (questioning "why
should not all [citizens and aliens alike] be entitled to the same constitutional
guarantees before being ordered out of the country?").
181. Id. at 239, 245-47.
182. Id. at 245-47.
183. Id.
[Vol. 41: p. 725
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cant may have a personal stake in the United States that needs to be
assessed. 184
Because the notion of community ties allows for an assessment
of "the actual relationships the individual has developed with a soci-
ety: a family, friends, a job, association memberships, professional
acquaintances, opportunities," individuals outside of the United
States may have varying stakes in the United States and therefore,
be entitled to varying degrees of due process. 185 For example,
Aleinikoff recognizes a first time entrant may have established a
"pre-existing" stake in the community, coming to the United States
after being granted an immigrant visa through family or an em-
ployer located in the United States. 186 On the other hand, first
time entrants on a nonimmigrant visa may have less of an interest at
stake. 187 By contrast, they are not planning to make the United
States their permanent home and probably have demonstrated that
they will return to their country in order even to be issued the
visa. 188 The restriction of due process, which could lead to the ex-
clusion of the intended immigrant, would disrupt his or her entire
future life.' 89 Restricting due process in the case of the individual
coming to the United States for a brief stay, however, would create
less of a disruption. 90 Considering the differing interests, greater
due process should be accorded to an intending immigrant who
potentially has more at stake. 91
For individuals living outside of the United States, the courts
generally have taken a limited view of the rights which should be
awarded to them both in the immigration and nonimmigration
context.19 2 In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court
denied Fourth Amendment protection to an individual after classi-
184. Id.
185. Id. at 244-47 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 246.
187. Id. at 246-47.
188. Id. Various sections of the INA provide for obtaining a nonimmigrant
visa. See, e.g., INA § 101(a) (15) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (B) (1994) (providing
for temporary visitors); INA § 101 (a) (15) (F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (F) (provid-
ing for bona fide students); INA § 101(a) (15) (H), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (H)
(providing for certain occupations); INA §101(a)(15)UJ), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (15) J) (providing for participants in United States Information Agency
programs).
189. Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 247.
190. Id. at 246-47.
191. Id. at 245-47.
192. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608, 616-21 (1960) (upholding
statute which deprived deported persons of social security benefits). For a further
discussion of Flemming, see supra note 114-15 and accompanying text.
1996]
39
Kelly: Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing Not
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
flying the respondent as having no ties or membership in the
United States, despite physically awaiting criminal prosecution in
the United States. 193 The Verdugo-Urquidez Court found that Yick
Wo, Wong Wing and the aliens' rights cases which developed in their
wake, "establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections
when they have come within the territory of the Untied States and
developed substantial connections with this country."1 94 Following
this rationale, the Court's decision in Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United
States'95 can be justified.' 96 In Russian Volunteer Fleet, the Court
found that the appellant, while a nonresident of the United States,
had property here and therefore, was entitled to protection.
9 7
In the immigration context, rights of aliens seeking entry also
receive minimal attention. For example, the Court easily dismissed
the challenge before proceeding to examine more closely the
claims of the United States citizens involved in the suit in Kleindienst
v. Mandel.198 The Court noted that "[i]t is clear that Mandel per-
sonally, as an unadmitted and nonresident alien, had no constitu-
tional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or
otherwise."' 9 9 Even Justice Marshall, dissenting so as to recognize
the rights of the United States citizen appellees, did not openly dis-
agree with the holding of the majority regarding the rights of
Mandel.20 0 Similarly, the majority and the dissent agreed that the
Court had limited judicial responsibility with respect to Congress's
power to regulate the admission of undocumented children living
abroad in Fiallo v. Bell.2 0 1 The key to all of these cases does not
193. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). For a further
discussion of Verdugo-Urquidez, see supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
194. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
195. 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
196. Id. (holding that alien petitioner had Fifth Amendment right to just
compensation for property taken by United States).
197. Id. at 489-92. The Court found that the Fifth Amendment duty of just
compensation for the taking of property applied fully to the property of nonresi-
dent aliens. Id.
198. 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
199. Id.; see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954) (describing con-
gressional power with respect to admission of aliens as "very broad"); United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (noting "[a]dmission of
aliens to the United States is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States
Government"); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904)
(stating that "those who are excluded cannot assert the rights . .. in a land to
which they do not belong as citizens or otherwise").
200. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201. 430 U.S. 787, 792-95 (1977); id. at 805 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Fiallo
involved the challenge of three sets of unwed natural fathers and their illegitimate
offspring. Id. at 790.
764 (Vol. 41: p. 725
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seem to be whether the case involves a challenge to an immigration
or a nonimmigration law, but whether the individual demonstrated
an attachment to the national community or community ties.
VII. THE MUTUALITY APPROACH
Relying on either Martin's or Aleinikoff's theory, withholding
constitutional rights from aliens similarly situated to Verdugo-Ur-
quidez could be justified. An individual with neither a claim to
membership nor any discernible ties to the United States is argua-
bly not entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment or any
other significant substantive or procedural constitutional rights.202
Yet, despite the ostensible lack of connection to the United States,
such an individual should still be entitled to protection.
A. Gerald Neuman: The Mutuality Approach
Gerald Neuman directly addresses the application of constitu-
tional protections to aliens living outside the United States who
have never resided or visited the United States.20 3 Interestingly,
Martin and Neuman begin from the same premise: that any consid-
eration of the Constitution's application should be in keeping with
the social contract tradition.20 4 Yet, from this point, the theories of
Martin and Neuman drastically diverge. Neuman recognizes that
aliens abroad essentially have been invited to enter into a nation's
social contract whenever they are subject to its law. 205 Thus, the
rationale of his mutuality approach is that "American constitutional
rights and the obligation of obedience to American law go together
... the rights and the obligations are coextensive." 20 6
202. For a further discussion of Martin's and Aleinikoff's theories, see supra
notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
203. Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 30, at 981.
204. See Martin, supra note 28, at 193-204 (discussing relationship between
membership and due process); Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 30, at 976-
77 (discussing social contract tradition). Neuman, reflecting on the social contract
tradition, asserts:
The United States Constitution has long been understood as a fundamen-
tal law within the meaning of the social contract tradition - a design for
government and limitations on government that protect the interests of
the governed sufficiently to form part of a justification of their obligation
of obedience to it. Establishing a legitimate government empowers that
government to generate obligations that would not exist in anarchy or a
state of nature.
Id. at 976-77.
205. Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 30, at 923-25 (discussing aliens
and social contract).
206. Id. at 977. Neuman refers to the "mutuality approach" as the."municipal
law approach." Id. In a forthcoming book, however, Neuman renames the theory,
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Following this rationale, "when the United States asserts an
alien's obligation to comply with American law, the alien is pre-
sumptively entitled pro hac vice to all constitutional rights."20 7 The
mutuality approach once applied only to a nation's own territory as
the territory defined the sphere in which a nation's municipal law
operated.208 The United States has, however, increasingly sub-
jected individuals abroad to U.S. law when either the United States
as a country or its citizens are affected.2 09 Now that the United
States is living in an era of extraterritorial legislation, the mutuality
approach and the protections it offers should be extended beyond
the nation's territory when situations arise in which either U.S. citi-
zens or foreigners abroad are compelled to obey U.S. law.2 10 Such
an approach properly addresses how the Constitution can fairly, but
in a limited scope, apply abroad. The mutuality approach clearly
limits the extraterritorial application of the Constitution and its
protections to the case of an individual abroad being subjected to
U.S. law either voluntarily or involuntarily. 211 In so doing, this ap-
proach is less encompassing than a universalist's approach. 21 2 Most
calling it the "mutuality approach." GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION 97-100 (1996). The term "mutuality" used throughout this discussion re-
fers to what Neuman previously referred to as the "municipal law approach." For a
further discussion of the mutuality doctrine, see Scaperlanda, Marshall's Jurispru-
dence, supra note 25, at 69 n.83.
207. Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 30, at 978.
208. Id. at 977-78.
209. Id. at 978-81.
210. Id. at 977-78. The mutuality approach considers the need for "an appro-
priate evolutionary response to changes in the technology of transportation and
communication, background international practices, and American self-assertion."
Id. at 980.
211. Id. at 984 (discussing application of Constitution to individuals abroad).
Neuman argues:
[C]onstitutional rights should not be interpreted as restricting all govern-
ment action against all persons in all places, even when the government
does not assert its sovereignty over the individual. This does not mean
that such uses of force or wealth are immune from demands for justifica-
tion, but simply that the standards ofjustification are not to be sought in
the United States Constitution.
Id.
212. See id. at 983-84 (discussing application of universalist/mutuality ap-
proach). A universalist applying the mutuality approach consistent with the social
contract theory would argue that the proper sphere is planet Earth and that U.S.
federal statutes which demand universal obedience (reflected in prohibitions on
international drug smuggling, counterfeiting) make all humans subjects of the
American social contract. Id. at 982-83. Such an approach "would transcend the
concerns of a single social contract and bind the government to the rules of a just
world order." Id. at 983. Neuman finds that a universalist approach would dilute
the protections the Constitution offers in the United States by applying it in a
broader, global context, rather than the more limited, national context for which
it was drafted. Id. at 984.
766
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importantly, this approach is in keeping with the spirit of Reid v.
Covert,2 13 which recognizes correlation of rights and obligations for
U.S. citizens abroad, and protects their constitutional rights when
subjected to U.S. legislation. 214
B. A Mutualist's Criticism of the Membership Approach
Following the mutuality approach, the flaws of a traditional
Hobbesian "members only" approach, as reflected in Chief Justice
Rhenquist's Verdugo-Urquidez decision and Martin's membership
theory, become apparent.21 5 One of the inherent difficulties of the
membership approach is the illegitimacy of a nation exercising ex-
traterritorial power without entitling those subjected to the power
to any individual rights. Such a Hobbesian argument "would en-
able the government to withhold constitutional rights, but only at
the price of delegitimating its claim to obedience." 21 6 A Hobbesian
could try to justify this approach as a necessary means of survival. 217
Additionally, a Hobbesian might characterize this use of power as
an exception to the restraints of the social contract theory.218 Yet,
213. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
214. Id. Neuman recognizes at the outset that Reid does not definitively apply
to noncitizens, but argues that its holding should apply. Neuman, Whose Constitu-
tion, supra note 30, at 915-16, 986-87. Other commentators also question the ex-
tent of the Constitution's application abroad. See Martin, supra note 28, at 179
n.51 (discussing Supreme Court cases regarding application of Constitution
abroad). Since Reid, commentators have discussed the lower courts' recognition of
the constitutional rights of aliens abroad and one commentator, Louis Henkin,
suggests that the Court has overruled previous dicta suggesting that "[t]he Consti-
tution [can have] no operation in another country." Henkin, Constitution as Com-
pact and Conscience, supra note 26, at 22-24; see also United States v. Demanett, 629
F.2d 862, 866 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating Fourth Amendment applies to alien aboard
foreign flag vessel); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 271, 275 (2d Cir.
1974) (holding U.S. officials' illegal conduct of torturing and forcibly bringing to
United States accused, invalidated victim's trial in United States); Greenham Wo-
men Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (refusing
case for being political and nonjusticiable; involving citizens of Great Britain as-
serting constitutional rights on British soil), aff'd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 242-44 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (holding Con-
stitution applies to criminal proceedings and alien has right to jury trial in U.S.
court abroad).
215. See Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 30, at 912 (criticizing Justice
Rhenquist's decision in Verdugo-Urquidez).
216. Id. at 984-85 (relying on THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 272-73 (C.B. Mac-
pherson ed., 1985)).
217. Id. at 984. A Hobbesian justifies this approach on the basis of a concern
for national security. Id. As the nation-state operates in a state of nature, i.e., war,
survival is the predominate concern. Id.
218. Id. at 985. A Hobbesian might argue that the impossibility of getting
actual or tacit consent from an alien when a nation exercises its authority abroad
removes a nation's use of power abroad from the social contract theory. Id. Yet,
many would argue that this idea has no distinction from the social contract the-
1996]
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to accept that aliens have no rights abroad would be to ignore the
fact that if an individual is subjected to U.S. laws in some fashion,
he or she has implicitly joined the national polity.2 19 Moreover,
freeing U.S. power abroad from constitutional restraint would pre-
vent any limit to the severity of the laws exercised abroad. 220
Extending the doctrine of mutuality beyond U.S. territory can
perhaps be effectively countered as some valid arguments exist to
limit the Constitution to within U.S. territory.221 Recognizing these
problems does not signify, however, that the Constitution has no
application abroad. 222 In order to maintain the spirit of Reid v. Cov-
ert and legitimate the demand for compliance with U.S. law abroad,
the United States must extend constitutional rights to everyone
abroad who is subject to its laws. 223 Such an approach would pre-
vent the threat that a members only approach poses to the limiting
of the rights of aliens here.2 24 As suggested by Gerald Neuman:
By requiring the government to afford constitutional
rights whenever it asserts legal obligation against any
human being, the [mutuality] approach respects the func-
tion that fundamental law serves in the social contract tra-
dition. Its sense ofjurisdictional limits has proven capable
of evolution, and has lessened the temptation to retreat to
forms of constitutionalism "for members only" that were
ory's inherent problem of it being impossible to show actual or tacit consent. Id.
(citing DAVID P. GAUTHIER, MORAL DEALING: CONTRACT, ETHICS AND REASON 53-57
(1990) (discussing social contract theory); JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT TRADITION 266-79 (1986) (same);JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 12-
13 (1971) (same); David Hume, Of the Original Contract (1777), reprinted in ESSAYS:
MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 475 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1985) (same)).
219. Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 30, at 972, 985-86.
220. Id. at 985-86.
221. See id. (discussing importance of extending Constitution beyond U.S. ter-
ritory). The counter to an extension of the doctrine of mutuality beyond the
United States is that the Constitution is "an artifact of an era of territorial nation-
states" and that era continues. Id. at 979. Also, while Neuman recognizes that it is
administratively difficult to apply the Constitution overseas, he argues that as the
government's power abroad increases, practical difficulties should not prevent the
Constitution's application overseas. Id.
222. See id. at 979-80 (discussing historical and contemporary arguments
which can be used to define personal and geographic scope of Constitution); see
also Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, supra note 40, at 21 n.54 (recognizing
question of whether aliens should be subject to U.S. power even if outside national
boundaries).
223. Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 30, at 986-87.
224. Id. at 990. Neuman, in observing that aliens may be better off without a
members only approach, points to Justice Rehnquist's suggestion in dicta that
"newly arrived aliens might not be included among 'the people."' Id. at 990 (quot-
ing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271-74 (1990)).
[Vol. 41: p. 725
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wrong [with the passage of the Alien Act of 1798] and are
wrong today.2 25
C. Mutuality and the Courts
Neuman is not alone in recognizing that it defies rationality to
deny rights to aliens not residing in the United States.22 6 The
Supreme Court is credited with a "long-held and recently reaf-
firmed commitment to apply the Constitution's due process and
equal protection guarantees to all individuals within the reach of
our sovereignty. '"2 27 It is also recognized that by virtue of our com-
mon humanity all individuals should be entitled to similar constitu-
tional rights. 228
Even Professor Martin, who accepts some disparate treatment
of individuals depending upon alienage, respects all persons' com-
mon humanity and thereby reveals his own misgivings about treat-
ing individuals as nonpersons within the meaning of the
225. Id. at 990-91. The Alien Act of 1798 authorized the President upon mere
suspicion to expel, upon ex parte order, any alien the President judged dangerous
to the peace or safety or that the President believed was involved in any act of
treason against the government. Id. at 927-39 (discussing generally Alien Act).
226. See id. (arguing for government to afford constitutional protection when-
ever it asserts its power against any human being); see alsoJean v. Nelson, 472 U.S.
846, 874 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (arguing "the principle that unadmitted
aliens have no constitutionally protected rights defies rationality"). Dissenting in
Jean, Justice Marshall relied on the dissenting opinions of Justices Black, Frank-
furter and Douglas in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953),
which argued that only a perverse interpretation of the Constitution would deny
aliens the right to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Jean, 472 U.S. at
874 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Jackson in Mezei asked the rhe-
torical question whether "[b]ecause the respondent has no right of entry, does it
follow that he has no rights at all?" Mezei, 345 U.S. at 226 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
In Mezei, Jackson concluded that detention procedures must "meet the test of due
process of law." Id. at 227 (Jackson, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of
Marshall's dissent on this issue, see Scaperlanda, Marshall's Jurisprudence, supra note
25, at 62-67.
227. Jean, 472 U.S. at 874-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
228. See id. at 875 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that principles of Four-
teenth Amendment apply to "aliens, for '[w]hatever his status under the immigra-
tion laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term."'
(quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982))); id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting "[s]uch emphasis on universal coverage is not surprising, given that the
Fourteenth Amendment was specifically intended to overrule a legal fiction similar
to that undergirding Knauff Chew, and Mezei - that freed slaves were not 'people
of the United States"') (quoting Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404
(1857))); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (noting that "(e]ven one whose
resence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory, is entitled to Due
rocess protection"); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 755 (1893)
(Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that to deny Fourth Amendment protection to
aliens would be "undisguised despotism and tyranny ... not permissible under our
Constitution").
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Constitution.2 29 This acknowledgment illustrates that to make any
distinction which accepts providing less rights to certain classifica-
tions of persons is to ignore their common humanity and ultimately
leads to the treatment of individuals as nonpersons. At the ex-
treme, denying rights to inadmissable aliens condones subjecting
aliens to inhumane treatment at the hands of the government.230
Beyond recognizing the principles of mutuality and respect for
our common humanity, while the "slate is not clean," case law does
not prohibit extending constitutional rights to aliens outside our
borders.23' As Justice Brennan stated in Baker v. Carr,232 "it is error
to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign re-
lations lies beyond judicial cognizance."2 3 3 Justice Marshall sug-
gested that only dicta in Mezei prevents undocumented aliens at the
border from invoking the equal protection guarantees of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 34 Justice Marshall found
that "[t]his broad dicta, however, can withstand neither the weight
of logic nor that of principle, and has never been incorporated into
the fabric of our constitutional jurisprudence." 23 5 The authority of
the political branches over entry decisions is not unbridled. 23 6 "In-
deed, '[our] cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsi-
229. See Martin, supra note 28, at 176, 216 (discussing traditional extension of
Constitution to aliens and citizens alike).
230. See Jean, 472 U.S. at 874 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating "[o]nly the
most perverse reading of the Constitution would deny detained aliens the right to
bring constitutional challenges to the most basic conditions of their confine-
ment"). As Justice Jackson stated in Mezei:
Does the power to exclude mean that exclusion may be continued or
effectuated by any means which happen to seem appropriate to the au-
thorities? It would effectuate [an alien's] exclusion to eject him bodily
into the sea or to set him adrift in a rowboat. Would not such measure be
condemned judicially as a deprivation of life without due process of law?
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 226-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
231. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (entrusting procedural due
process policies to Congress). This language in Galvan has often been relied on to
justify severe immigration policies. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-93 n.4
(1977) (relying on Galvan in declining to circumscribe Congress's power to ex-
clude aliens); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1972) (relying on Gal-
van in deportation case). But see Martin, supra note 28, at 235 (calling for Supreme
Court to "develop a due process jurisprudence that takes realistic account of
aliens' differing ties to this national community").
232. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
233. Id. at 211.
234. Jean, 472 U.S. at 868-69 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953) (discussing resident alien's right to
due process); United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
(noting "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned").
235. Jean, 472 U.S. at 868-69 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 875 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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bility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of
Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens."' 23 7
Yet, entitling all aliens to equal protection and due process,
regardless of their location to the U.S. border does not require ig-
noring the interests of the government.238 Consideration should
be given to all of the interests at stake. Therefore, "[t]he proper
constitutional inquiry must concern the scope of the equal protec-
tion and due process rights at stake, and not whether the Due Pro-
cess Clause can be invoked at all."2 39
VIII. CREATING A CONSTITUTIONALLY HUMANE APPROACH
Having begun this discussion with a review of the limitations of
the plenary power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition, the al-
ternative theories advocated by Martin, Aleinikoff and Neuman
were reviewed in an attempt to find a tool for creating policies af-
fecting aliens that will properly consider the interests of all the par-
ties. The mutuality approach recognizes that all individuals,
regardless of their ties to the United States, should be accorded
rights if subjected to U.S. law. Yet, theories based on community
ties and membership reveal the importance of these interests. Rec-
ognizing these principles, it is suggested that a mutuality approach,
which incorporates proper consideration for membership, commu-
nity ties and the alternative interests of all of the affected parties be
followed.2 40
237. Id. at 875-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
793 n.5 (1977)). As Fifth Amendment protections are available to aliens, protect-
ing such a person from the deprivation of their property, "[i]t simply is irrational
to maintain that the Constitution protects an alien from deprivations of property,
but not from deprivations of 'life' or 'liberty' . . . . Such a distinction is rightfully
foreign to the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 874 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Mar-
shall also points out that while Fifth Amendment protection is provided at criminal
proceedings, it is absurd to require an alien to commit a crime before he or she is
entitled to Fifth Amendment protection. Id. at 873 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
238. See id. at 882 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing reasons for depriving
one of liberty). Justice Marshall suggests that the deprivation of liberty should
result only after a showing of reasons "closely related to immigration concerns." Id.
For example, classifications may be constitutional if they are "employed in connec-
tion with decisions that lie at the heart of immigration policy." Id. at 881 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976)
(noting "due process requires that [an agency's] decisions to impose [a] depriva-
tion of an important liberty . .. be justified by reasons which are properly the
concern of that agency")).
239. Id. at 876-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
240. To the extent that the consideration of community ties encompasses no-
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Whether inside or outside the U.S. border, once an individual
is subjected to U.S. laws, the mutuality approach would entitle him
or her to constitutional rights. Such a constitutionally humane ap-
proach is consistent with traditional due process determinations
and evaluates the interests at stake for both the individual and the
government.241 This type of uniform approach will yield fairer and
more predictable results than attempts to forcibly characterize a
legal challenge as one involving the plenary power doctrine or the
aliens' rights tradition. Moreover, such an approach brings federal
authority over aliens "within the fold of other constitutional
powers." 242
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL HuMANITY IN THE FAMiLY
UNIFICATION ARENA
A. The Rights of the Undocumented Family Member
By utilizing a constitutionally humane approach for an un-
documented alien who wants to be united with his or her lawful
family in the United States, it first can be acknowledged that the
desire to unite with family brings an individual under U.S. immigra-
tion law regarding family unity.243 Having crossed the mutuality
step of this approach, the discussion would then turn to consider-
ing the individual interests at stake and the countervailing govern-
mental interests.
While there has been a refusal to weigh the interests of aliens
against any governmental interests,244 courts have demonstrated
241. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (evaluating interests
of government and individual). The value of additional procedures and the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the interest must also be considered in the Mathews
calculus. Id. at 335.
242. Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 26, at 867.
243. For a further discussion of the current immigration law, see supra note
11-13 and accompanying text.
244. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (explaining that Congress's
power to expel or exclude aliens is fundamental sovereign attribute and largely
immune from judicial control); Kleindienstv. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972)
(recognizing Congress's exclusive sovereign power to exclude aliens); Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 210 (1953) (stating that once alien is admit-
ted and begins to develop ties that go with permanent residence, his or her consti-
tutional status changes accordingly entitling him or her to fair hearing when
threatened with deportation), modified in part by Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21
(1982); see also Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 82 (recognizing development
of balancing test in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), pitting alien's ties to
United States against national interest).
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their competence in balancing competing interests. 245 The
Plasencia Court recognized that a lawful permanent resident's
home, work and family are his or her ties to the U.S. community
and the Court indicated that these interests must be weighed
against the government's interests.2 46 Having outlined a balancing
test in Plasencia, the Court implied that if courts are competent to
conduct balancing tests for lawful permanent residents, they are
competent to do so for undocumented aliens who are challenging
restrictions to their asserted right to family unity.247
In conducting such a test, courts can compare possible in-
fringements upon the rights of an undocumented alien who at-
tempts to unite with lawful permanent resident family members,
with the restrictions placed on an individual related to a U.S. citi-
zen. By virtue of their "common humanity," an argument can be
made that an individual related to a lawful permanent resident
should be afforded protection equal to that given an individual re-
lated to a U.S. citizen.2 48
An alien's wait to be united with his or her petitioning family
member is, however, determined by the petitioning family mem-
ber's immigration status.249 Thus, while an alien who is the child of
a lawful permanent resident has no less of an interest in being
united with his or her parent than the child of a U.S. citizen, these
245. See Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 84 (discussing Court's balancing
of interests); see also Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 21 (considering various interests). For a
further discussion of Plasencia, see supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
246. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32.
247. See Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 84 (arguing Court's ability to bal-
ance interests). Matsumoto-Power argues specifically for the marital rights of
aliens married to United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. Id. The
work of Matsumoto-Power significantly advanced my thinking on this issue.
248. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 754 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (stating aliens living in United States by permission of government are
entitled to same guarantee of protection of their person and property as native-
born citizens). Regarding the issue of treating citizen's and resident alien's family
reunification interests differently, Professor John Guendelsberger, now a BIA
member, proposed that "immediate relatives" be defined to include permanent
residents' spouses and children under the age of 18. Guendelsberger, Family Unifi-
cation, supra note 14, at 87-91.
In comparing American and German systems of immigration, Motomura
notes that Germany's system does not differentiate in waiting times between
reunification interests of an alien related to a citizen and those of an alien related
to a lawful permanent resident. Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A
Roadmapfor the Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 Am.J. COMP. L. 511, 517 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Family and Immigration]; see also Guendelsberger, Family Unification, supra note
14 (comparing French and American family reunification policies).
249. For a discussion of family unification provisions, see supra note 11-12 and
accompanying text.
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two children are subjected to different waiting periods.2 50 Other
relatives are also treated unequally depending upon whether they
are related to a U.S. citizen or a lawful resident. For example, an
alien who is the sibling of a lawful permanent resident has no right
to residency based upon this relationship, whereas the sibling of a
U.S. citizen is eligible for residency through this relationship, al-
beit, after a lengthy wait.25 1
In addition to considering the disparate treatment of individu-
als related to lawful permanent residents in comparison with those
related to U.S. citizens, the courts can consider the damage to the
right of family unity which results from being required to wait any
length of time to unite with one's family.25 2 As recognized by the
Court in Plasencia, the right to rejoin immediate family is "a right
that ranks high among the interests of the individual."253
The courts also may address the infringement on the right to
unity with extended family. Only the nuclear family-parents,
spouses, siblings and children-has any right to immigrate to the
250. INA § 201(b) (2) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2) (A) (i) (1994) (describing
eligibility of child of U.S. citizen); INA § 203(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2) (describ-
ing eligibility of spouse and children of lawful permanent resident). The child of a
U.S. citizen is not subject to any worldwide levels or numerical limitation and
thereby is immediately eligible for residency. INA § 201(b) (2) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b) (2) (A) (i). Yet, the child of a lawful permanent resident is within the
"second preference" visa allocation category and is currently subject to almost a
four year wait. INA§ 203(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2); U.S. State Dep't, Immigrant
Visa Preference Numbers for Dec. 1996, available at 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1306 app.
11 (1996) [hereinafter Immigrant Visa Preference Numbers]. Creating even more dis-
parity, the parent of an adult U.S. citizen is immediately eligible for residency,
while the parent of an adult lawful permanent resident has no right to residency
based on this relation. INA § 201(b) (2) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2) (A) (i).
251. INA § 203(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4). The current wait for residency
through a sibling who is a U.S. citizen is approximately 10 years. Immigrant Visa
Preference Numbers, supra note 250, at 338.
252. See INA § 203(a)(1)-(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(5) (discussing waiting
periods). The following individuals are subject to visa limitations and waiting peri-
ods: unmarried children, 21 years of age and over, of a U.S. citizen are given "first
preference" and currently have approximately an eight month wait, INA
§ 203(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1); spouses and unmarried children under the age
of 21 of lawful permanent residents are given "second preference" and suffer ap-
proximately a four year wait, INA § 203 (a) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2) (A); un-
married children 21 and over of lawful permanent residents, categorized as
"second preference-B," suffer almost a six year wait, INA § 203 (a) (3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (a) (2) (B); married children of U.S. citizens are given "third preference"
and suffer over a three year wait, INA § 203(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (3); and sib-
lings of U.S. citizens are given "fourth preference" and suffer over a 10 year wait,
INA § 203(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4). Immigrant Visa Preference Numbers, supra
note 250, at 338.
253. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
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United States.254 No provisions exist to allow unity with such ex-
tended family members as grandparents, cousins, aunts and uncles.
The rights enumerated in Moore v. City of East Cleveland have quietly
joined the ranks of constitutional rights disregarded in U.S. immi-
gration law.255
With marriage being one of the strongest ties to the national
community,25 6 the courts should fully evaluate how U.S. immigra-
tion law restricts this interest and the interest in family unity.2 57 By
254. While the spouse and unmarried children under 21 of both a U.S. citi-
zen and a U.S. resident are entitled to immigrate, only U.S. citizen's married chil-
dren, parents and siblings are entitled. to immigrate. For a discussion of how
certain individuals are subject to worldwide limits on family immigration, see supra
note 250-52 and accompanying text.
255. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504 (enumerating right of family unity). While
Moore implicitly recognized the fundamental right of unity within an immediate
family, the critical right protected in Moore was unification within an extended fam-
ily. See id. at 504-06. The Court stated that: "Ours is by no means a tradition
limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family ....
[Rather,] the tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents shar-
ing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and
equally deserving of constitutional recognition." Id. Also in Moore, Justice Bren-
nan stated that:
In today's America, the 'nuclear family' is the pattern so often found in
much of white suburbia (citation omitted). The Constitution cannot be
interpreted, however, to tolerate the imposition by government upon the
rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living
.... [T/he prominence of other than nuclear families among ethnic and racial
minority groups, including our black citizens, surely demonstrates that the 'ex-
tended family' pattern remains a vital tenet of our society.
Id. 508-10 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Guendelsberger,
Family Unification, supra note 14, at 51-53 (discussing defining family by kinship or
through functional approach).
In discussing the German system, Motomura observes that the German system
considers "extraordinary hardship" in granting residence permits to family mem-
bers other than spouses and unmarried children. Motomura, Family and Immigra-
tion, supra note 248, at 528-30. In contrast, U.S. courts have refused to recognize
extended family relationships in awarding residency. See INS v. Hector, 479 U.S.
85, 88-91 (1986) (finding question of "extreme hardship" cannot include hardship
to alien's citizen nieces in suspension of deportation claim pursuant to INA § 244).
256. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (discussing interest in marriage). In
Plasencia, the Court recognized that a permanent resident's interest in rejoining
her husband and children in the United States was "a right that ranks high among
the interests of the individual." Id.
The Court has also addressed the fundamental rights of the family. See
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (discussing fundamental right to marry);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing fundamental right of individuals
of different races to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discuss-
ing fundamental right of marital privacy and privacy in one's associations with
others). For a further discussion of the fundamental rights of the family, see supra
notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
257. See Kathryn L. Anderson, Adams v. Howerton: Avoiding Constitutional
Challenges to Immigration Policies Through Judicial Deference, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 318, 324-27 (1983) (discussing and criticizing protection accorded marital
bond between alien and U.S. citizen); Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 77-80
1996]
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asserting the rights of marriage and marital privacy, courts can con-
sider the unequal treatment of the spouse of a lawful permanent
resident as compared to the spouse of a U.S. citizen. While cur-
rently it requires almost four years for an alien spouse of a lawful
permanefit resident to immigrate lawfully to the United States
through a petition filed by the spouse,258 an alien married to a U.S.
citizen is immediately eligible for residency.25 9
B. The Rights of the United States Citizen or Resident Family Member
In following the constitutionally humane approach, not only
are the rights of the alien recognized, but the rights of the petition-
ing family member living lawfully in the United States also can be
protected. In cases involving challenges to immigration laws by un-
documented aliens, the rights of the U.S. citizen's or lawful perma-
nent resident's family members traditionally have been ignored.2 60
Although courts in immigration cases routinely recognize the im-
portance of considering an alien's marriage to a U.S. citizen, 26 1
they do not give any serious consideration to the U.S. citizen's fun-
damental right to marry and to marital privacy.2 62
(same); Note, The Constitutionality of the IN.S. Sham Marriage Investigation Policy, 99
HARv. L. REV. 1238, 1243-49 (1986) (same).
258. INA § 203(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2); Immigration Visa Preference Num-
bers, supra note 250, at 1306 app. II.
259. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (b) (2) (A) (i); Immigration Visa Preference Numbers, supra
note 250, at 1306 app. II.
260. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (stating Congress's power to
expel or exclude aliens is fundamental sovereign attribute and largely immune
from judicial control); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953) (recognizing Congress's power to expel or exclude aliens is largely immune
from judiciary), modified in part by, Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982); Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (stating alien's entry into United States is
"privilege" and not right); see also Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 76 (stating
that application of immigration laws to alien spouses of U.S. citizens typically
abridgement of U.S. citizen's fundamental rights).
261. See Isreal v. INS, 785 F.2d 738, 741 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing con-
siderable weight afforded to alien's marriage to U.S. citizen); Matter of Ibrahim,
18 I. & N. Dec. 55 (BIA 1981) (recognizing marriage to citizen is special weighty
equity accorded most favorable status by Congress); Matter of Cavazos, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 215 (BIA 1980) (holding factors of alien being married to citizen and mother
of citizen child outweighed adverse factor of entering United States with precon-
ceived intent to remain); Matter of Garcia, 16 1. & N. Dec. 653 (BIA 1975) (recog-
nizing marriage to U.S. citizen sufficient equity); Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59,
at 76 (recognizing that marriage to U.S. citizen is major factor to consider).
262. SeeSmith v. INS, 684 F. Supp. 1113, 1116-17 (D. Mass. 1988) (stating U.S.
citizen's marital rights are subservient to exercise of congressional power in area of
immigration and naturalization). Commentators, such as Matsumoto-Power and
Guendelsberger, suggest that courts may not recognize the restrictions upon the
fundamental right of marriage created by United States immigration law, because
the procedures do not infringe upon a fundamental right as they place "no obsta-
776 [Vol. 41: p. 725
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A majority of the Supreme Court upheld sections of the INA
excluding the relationship between an illegitimate child and his or
her natural father (as opposed to his or her natural mother) from
the definition of the parent-child relationship.263 Likewise, the
Court. rejected an equal protection challenge to the difference be-
tween the waiting periods imposed on an alien married to a U.S.
citizen versus one married to a permanent resident.2 64 Despite the
Court's indication that limited judicial responsibility exists with re-
spect to Congress's power to regulate the admission and exclusion
of aliens,265 decisions like those in Kliendienst v. Mandel and Fiallo v.
Bell reflect a willingness to allow Congress's assertion of sovereign
interest to trump the fundamental constitutional interests of U.S.
citizens upon a showing of a "facially legitimate and bona fide
reason."
266
cles-absolute or otherwise" upon the exercise of the right of marriage. See
Guendelsberger, Family Unification, supra note 14, at 7 (discussing natural right of
family unification); Matsumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 75-76 (discussing right of
marriage).
In the past, the Court when analyzing fundamental rights has examined
whether the right is infringed upon by the challenged activity. See Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978) (holding strict scrutiny given only to immi-
gration regulations having "a direct and substantial impact on the right to marry");
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52-54 (1977) (upholding provisions of Social Secur-
ity Act that arguably burdened claimant's constitutional right to marry by terminat-
ing financial benefits upon marrying); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)
(discussing when fundamental rights are infringed upon and holding Connecticut
could constitutionally refuse to give Medicaid financing for nontherapeutic abor-
tions as statute placed no obstacles in pregnant woman's path to exercising the
right to have abortion). Guendelsberger accuses the courts deciding immigration
cases of paying "glib attention" to the rights protected in Moore, which prevent an
individual from having to move from one suburb to another suburb. Guendels-
berger, Family Unification, supra note 14, at 65-66, nn.473-74. By contrast, immigra-
tion cases suggest it would be acceptable for a person to be required to move to
another country in order to exercise their familial rights. Id.
263. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792-800 (holding sections 101 (b) (1) (D) and 101 (b) (2)
of INA of 1952 constitutional).
264. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975).
265. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5 (discussing Congress's power to expel or
exclude aliens as fundamental sovereign attribute and largely immune from judi-
cial control).
266. See id. at 792 (stating Congress's power to expel or exclude aliens is fun-
damental sovereign attribute and largely immune from judicial control); Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-67 (1972) (recognizing Congress's exclusive
sovereign power to exclude aliens). Critics of such an approach argue that "[t]he
underlying assumption in the United States seems to be that constitutional rights
apply only after anterior questions of membership (i.e., questions of immigration)
are resolved." Motomura, Family and Immigration, supra note 248, at 517; see also
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Justice Marshall, dissenting in both Mandel and Fiallo, recog-
nized the absurdity of allowing the government to restrict funda-
mental rights by the mere showing of a "facially legitimate and bona
fide reason," when such rights are normally limited only by a "com-
pelling governmental interest."267  Discussing the distinctions
among citizens through the parent-child definition, Justice Mar-
shall found that " [w] hen Congress grants a fundamental right to all
but an invidiously selected class of citizens, and it is abundantly
clear that such discrimination would be intolerable in any context
but immigration, it is our duty to strike the legislation down. '268
Congress should not be given unquestioning deference when
the rights of U.S. citizens are at stake. 269 As recognized by Martin
267. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 807-09, 816 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mande4 408 U.S.
at 775 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority in Mandel held that a U.S. citizen's
First Amendment rights can be restricted by the Attorney General's assertion of a
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason." Mande4 408 U.S. at 761-70. As Justice
Marshall acknowledged, however, "[mierely 'legitimate' governmental interests
cannot override constitutional rights." Id. at 777 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Prop-
erly considering the First Amendment rights of the appellees, Justice Marshall did
not see a "compelling governmental interest" that would override their First
Amendment rights and argued:
At least when the rights of Americans are involved, there is no basis for
concluding that the power to exclude aliens is absolute. When Congress'
exercise of one of its enumerated powers clashes with those individual
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it is our 'delicate and difficult
task' to determine whether the resulting restriction on freedom can be
tolerated.... [A]ll governmental power-even the war power, the power
to maintain national security, or the power to conduct foreign affairs-is
limited by the Bill of Rights. When individual freedoms of Americans are
at stake, we do not blindly defer to broad claims of the Legislative Branch
or Executive Branch, but rather we consider those claims in light of indi-
vidual freedoms.
Id. at 782-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Scaperlanda, Mar-
shall's Jurisprudence, supra note 25, at 58-61 (discussing Justice Marshall's approach
to fundamental rights for aliens).
It has been suggested, however, that the majority's decision in Mandel may not
controvert attempts to have the rights of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent family
members considered in challenges to U.S. family unification laws. Id. at 59. Mandel
can be viewed as a controversial and distinguishable decision, as it does not involve
the rights of an alien with direct ties to the United States or its citizens. See Mandel,
408 U.S. at 756-60 (reviewing claim of alien who had no substantial ties to United
States and had previously violated conditions of his temporary visa). The group of
citizens involved in Mandel can be characterized as "ill-defined." Matsumoto-
Power, supra note 59, at 85.
268. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 816 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
269. See United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 549 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing against unquestioning deference); Mat-
sumoto-Power, supra note 59, at 77 (same). Justice Frankfurter in Knauff chastised
such an approach by the Court stating:
It should not be assumed that Congress gave with a bountiful hand but
allowed its bounty arbitrarily to be taken away .... An alien's opportu-
nity of entry into the United States is of course a privilege which Congress
778 [Vol. 41: p. 725
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and Aleinikoff, as U.S. citizens are the most protected members of
our society, their constitutional rights are deserving of the utmost
protection, regardless of the government's assertion of the plenary
power doctrine.270 When the rights of U.S. citizens are "impli-
cated," absolute deference to the political branches and its sover-
eign interest becomes "inapplicable."2 7 1 As the fundamental rights
of lawful permanent residents have traditionally been recognized as
deserving nearly, if not the exact, protection provided to U.S. citi-
zens, then, just like in the case of a citizen, when these rights are at
stake absolute deference to the political branches is
inappropriate.272
When the fundamental rights of U.S. citizens or residents are
at stake, and the absolute defense of controlling sovereign interest
is removed, the recent case of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena2 73
lends support to subjecting the federal government to the same
level of scrutiny as the states in creating alienage classifications.2 74
The Court in Adarand indicated its willingness to hold the federal
may grant or withhold. But the crux of the problem before us is whether
Congress having extended the privilege for the benefit not of the alien
but of her American husband, left wide open the opportunity to ruth-
lessly take away what it gave.
Knauff 338 U.S. at 549.
270. Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, supra note 40, at 20-21; Martin,
supra note 28, at 208.
271. Mandel 408 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall distinguishes
this case from all of the cases invoking the plenary power doctrine as "all of them
involved only the rights of the excluded aliens themselves." Id. at 782 (Marshall,J.,
dissenting); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (evaluat-
ing claim of excluded alien); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (review-
ing claim of excluded alien). Later, Justice Marshall in his dissent in Fiallo argued
that any attempt to limit citizens' fundamental rights must comport with the Fifth
Amendment principles of due process and equal protection. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 800
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Despite the fact that Fiallo challenged an immigration
law, Justice Marshall's dissent was consistent with the Court's previous holdings
requiring strict scrutiny of legislation affecting "suspect" classifications. Id.
272. SeeAleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, supra note 40, at 26 (suggesting
that lawful permanent residents may have membership rights similar, if not equal
to citizens). Aleinikoff questions the distinctive rights of citizens versus residents
in the current family immigration system. Id.; see also Guendelsberger, Family Unifi-
cation, supra note 14, at 82-83 (recognizing many-inequities which have existed in
treatment of alien spouse and children from early immigration laws to present
day).
273. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
274. See id. (holding that question of whether government's use of subcon-
tractor compensation clause should be subject to strict scrutiny of Court); Kurfis,
supra note 86, at 134 (providing history of strict scrutiny of alienage classifications
and its development from lower standards). For a further discussion of the fact
that state and federal governments are being held to different standards of scru-
tiny regarding alienage classifications, see supra notes 82-87 and accompanying
text.
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government to the same standard of strict scrutiny as the states and
local governments when racial classifications are involved.2 75 Be-
cause the protection of racial classifications stems from the protec-
tion of alienage classifications, 2 76 it follows that it is equally
"unthinkable" for the federal government to be held to a lesser
standard than the states in legislating alienage classifications. 277
Adarand is only one block which can be used to build fair immi-
gration policies relating to family unity. Adarand strongly illustrates
that, despite the Court's historic unwillingness to protect individual
rights restricted by the federal government, the Court is prepared
to take into consideration the rights of all individuals affected.
Courts could properly address a challenge to immigration policies
by acknowledging that when the fundamental rights of U.S. citizens
or lawful permanent residents are at stake their constitutional
rights cannot be ignored.
C. Balancing the Interests
Following this approach does not suggest that there should be
no restriction on immigration or that the government's interest in
275. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097.
276. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (discussing applicabil-
ity of Fourteenth Amendment to aliens). Reliance on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's equal protection clause in challenges to racial classifications developed in
reliance on cases like Yick Wo. For example, while Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), upheld racial
segregation on the railroads, it did so in distinguishing itself from Yick Wo, finding
that the classifications in Yick Wo constituted "arbitrary and unjust discrimination."
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 79 (1975) (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550). The
Court in Plessy by contrast, found the Louisiana statute for racial segregation on
the railroad to be a reasonable regulation which could be upheld. Plessy, 163 U.S.
at 550. In criticizing the Plessy decision, Kluger finds Yick Wo's test for discrimina-
tion "antedated and yet exactly anticipated the Plessy doctrine and was available to
doom it." KLUGER, supra, at 712-13. Yick Wo determined discrimination existed if
law was administered "with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances."
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
Also demonstrating the similarity of racial and alienage classifications, the
Margold report, one of the early foundations upon which arguments were based to
attack and eliminate racially separate and unequal schooling, relied upon Yick Wo.
KLUGER, supra, at 135. Kluger also notes that the NAACP lawyer's statement to the
Supreme Court to take jurisdiction in Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C.
1951), vacated 342 U.S. 350 (1952), also contained recognition that the Court had
invalidated racial discrimination in other areas and included mention of Yick Wo's
invalidation of discrimination in the right to engage in gainful occupation.
KLUGER, supra, at 537-38; see Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 529 (addressing racially segre-
gated schools).
277. SeeBolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding state and federal
government are properly held to same standard of scrutiny in creating racially seg-
regated schools).
[Vol. 41: p. 725
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protecting its sovereign power should be ignored.2 78 In conducting
a proper balancing test, courts must balance these interests against
the rights of the individual. Arguments regarding the govern-
ment's interest in sovereignty, opening the floodgates to immigra-
tion, creating an unworkable system and the possibility of chain
migration can all be entertained by the courts.279 Thus, Congress
may still be able to justify the need for some family unity limitation
and perhaps the need for a visa preference scheme and allotment
based upon relations to either a U.S. citizen or resident. As the
U.S. citizen arguably possesses stronger ties and membership, per-
haps he or she should be entitled to immigration policy
preferences.280
It should be noted further that following a constitutionally hu-
mane approach does not lend strong support to extending the defi-
nition of family within immigration policies beyond the
relationships already constitutionally protected. For example, with-
out constitutional protection for homosexual relationships or po-
278. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2098 (recognizing need to weigh some inter-
ests); Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 783 (1972) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (rec-
ognizing need to balance interests). The Court in Adarand noted that "[p] olitical
judgments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed
in the constitutional balance, . . but the standard of justifications will remain
constant." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (relying on Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944)). In Mandel Justice Marshall acknowledged that if the govern-
ment could demonstrate a "compelling interest," the American appellees would
not have a successful challenge. Mandel; 408 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall offered as examples of compelling interest "[a]ctual threats to the
national security, public health needs, and genuine requirements of law enforce-
ment." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
279. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). Acknowledging the gov-
ernment's interest in immigration matters, the Plasencia Court instructed the lower
court on remand to "weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of
immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive
and the Legislature." Id. (relying on Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-93 (1977);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950); Japanese
Immigration Case, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903)).
Yet, Aleinikoff acknowledges, "the nation would hardly lose its ability to con-
trol the borders or to prevent subversion if modern constitutional conceptualiza-
tions of due process, equal protection, and fundamental rights were deemed to
constrain exercises of the immigration power." Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Member-
ship, supra note 40, at 20. In weighing these interests, courts may also consider the
somewhat counterintuitive argument that promoting the unification of a family
through immigration laws may work to prevent the economic problems which
force individuals to become dependent on the state. See Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 509 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing family
unification and economic problems).
280. For a discussion of community ties and membership, see supra notes 118-
33 and accompanying text.
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lygamy, the constitutionally humane approach is limited.281
Consequently, a criticism of this approach may be that it does not
demonstrate respect for relationships the judiciary is not ready to
protect or for the beliefs and customs of other cultures.28 2 While
this approach is constitutionally bound, it can develop with the
legal interpretation of fundamental rights. If, for example, Romer v.
Evans283 or Baehr v. Miike284 were to become a springboard for ho-
mosexual marital rights, an argument could be made for the family
unification rights in immigration law of a homosexual married
couple. 28 5 Following a constitutionally humane approach, any at-
tempt to limit these rights through immigration policies would be-
come subjected to a "compelling interest" standard.
X. CONCLUSION
As noted, applying a constitutionally humane approach does
not guarantee a final victory for the individual. 28 6 The constitution-
ally humane approach, like the plenary power approach, considers
the government's interest in sovereignty.28 7 Under the constitu-
tionally humane approach, however, the government's interest will
not predictably become the overriding concern. The interest of the
persons affected by the law will also be fully and fairly evaluated.
Following a constitutionally humane approach, the fundamental
right of the alien and his or her lawful family will begin to be prop-
erly assessed along with the rights of the government. Hopefully
then, this discussion will have served its limited purpose of initiat-
ing an open dialogue regarding the proper assessment of rights.288
281. See generally Anderson, supra note 257, at 310-11 (recognizing fact that
Refugee Act of 1980 only extends protection to individuals falling within statute's
narrow definition of refugee).
282. But see Guendelsberger, Family Unification, supra note 14, at 54-57 (dis-
cussing respect France's immigration system has for other cultures).
283. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
284. 65 U.S.L.W. 2399 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 1996) (No. 91-1394)
285. Gays'Right to Many Upheld, NEWSDAY, Dec. 4, 1996, at A5; The Message from
Hawaii, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1996, at A38.
286. See Aleinikoff, Community Ties, supra note 29, at 245 (discussing commu-
nity ties). Even in acknowledging the ties of different groups of individuals to the
United States and in balancing the rights of individuals against the remaining Mat-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1972) factors, reasonable people might ultimately
differ as to the degree the government versus the individual is affected. Id. For a
further discussion of the Eldridge factors, see supra note 132 and accompanying
text.
287. For a further discussion of the notion of sovereignty, see supra notes 38-
42 and accompanying text.
288. SeeJean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 880 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting this may not be appropriate place to set "the precise contours" of U.S.
[Vol. 41: p. 725
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In so doing, the inhumane results which have been reached in al-
lowing an unbridled deference to the plenary power can be pre-
vented.289 Such a constitutionally humane approach may lead
towards the treatment of aliens by federal authorities from the Con-
stitution's fundamental perspective of protecting the rights of the
individual.
immigration law's family unification policy); see also Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens,
Membership, supra note 40, at 26-27 (discussing Court's careful hedging in its state-
ments regarding theory of membership); Scaperlanda, Marshall's Jurisprudence,
supra note 25, at 67 (discussing Justice Marshall's failure to provide formula for
determining relationship between government's plenary immigration power and
rights of aliens).
289. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (stat-
ing individual excluded from United States by Court's strict adherence to will of
Congress and refusal to exercise discretion in permitting him to stay); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (noting Court's reliance
on immigration laws passed in wartime and observing that Congress did not intend
to permit members of armed services to marry and bring into United States aliens
that Congress had specifically excluded); see also Jean, 472 U.S. at 875 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (discussing bridled nature of immigration power); Martin, supra note
28, at 192 (commenting on mistakes of Knauff and Mezei).
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